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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CUSTOMS 
SERVICE ACTIONS 
PETER M. GERHART* 
This article is based on a report prepared for the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States in connection with its study of judicial review of 
actions taken by the U.S. Customs Service. The recommendations herein 
wer-e adopted in substantially identical form by the Administrative Confer-
ence at its September 19, 1977, plenary session. The article examines the 
present availability and scope if review of administrative decisions of the 
U.S. Customs Service. The author analyzes the overall operation if the 
Customs Service, procedures for internal review of Customs ,decisions and 
for assessment of penalties and other sanctions, and the distribution if 
jurisdiction to review Customs decisions between the U.S. Customs Court 
and the U.S. district courts. His conclusion iffers extensive recommenda-
tions for the reform if the existing system, addressing such -matters as 
jurisdicti?n; standing, burden if proof, and assessment of penalties. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article analyzes the adequacy of judicial reVIew of U.S. 
Customs Service actions. Its principal focus is on the role of the 
U.S. Customs Court and the federal district courts in overseeing 
and controlling Customs Service actions; its underlying theme is 
the manner in which laws relating to imports are administered and · 
applied. 
* Assistant Professor, Ohio State University College of Law; J.D. Columbia Law School 
(1971). . 
Some of the information in this article was obtained from interviews with customs attor-
neys, importers and brokers; many persons made helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
the report. Leonard Lehman, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs for Regulations and 
Rulings, was especially helpful. I received valuable research assistance from Teresa Bulman, 
a Georgetown Law Center student, who worked on the staff of the Administrative Confer-
ence in the summer of 1976, and from Stuart Goldberg, a third year student at Ohio State 
University College of Law. A number of persons gave valuable advice concerning the study 
and recommendations, notably David B. H. Martin, Research Director of the Administrative 
Conference, William H. Allen, Chairman of the Conference's Committee on Judicial Review, 
and Jeffrey S. Lubbers, a staff attorney at the Administrative Conference. 
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The U.S. Customs Service (Customs) is organized within the 
Treasury Department to administer and enforce a variety of stat-
utes regulating U.S. imports and exports. Its tasks include: process-
ing incoming travellers, vehicles, merchandise, and mail; collecting 
import duties and taxes; ensuring that prohibited merchandise is 
not brought into the country; preventing fraud; investigating al-
leged unfair import competition; and regulating trade and ship-
ping in many other ways. In all these tasks, Customs makes deci-
sions and exercises discretionary powers affecting many persons, 
under circumstances in which disputed issues of fact, law, and 
policy are likely to arise. 
Two courts share responsibility for reviewing Customs action. 
The Customs Court, a nine-judge constitutionaP tribunal located 
in New York City, is the exclusive forum for review of many 
administrative actions of Customs, but deals only with disputes 
arising under trade laws. 2 Other Customs actions are subject to 
review exclusively in federal district courts. 3 
Because analysis of the role of judicial review requires an under-
standing of the administrative process subject to review, this article 
begins with an overview of Customs Service operations. Recom-
mendations concerning changes in the administrative procedures 
of the Customs Service are, however, beyond the scope of this 
article. 
While this article focuses on recommendations concerning judi-
cial review of Customs Service actions. there is no assumotion 
. 1 
implicit that improved judicial review would be a panacea for all 
Customs' ills. Indeed, reforms in the administrative process at 
Customs may be far more important to effective and fair adminis-
tration of the law. The recommendations herein would open the 
administrative process to important judicially-mandated reforms, 
but in the final analysis judicial review must remain the ultimate, 
and not the principal, source of control of administrative action. 
Reforms in the process for judicial review are therefore only one 
part of an effective reform of the administration of customs laws. 
Rather than surveying all Customs procedures, this article will 
1 The Customs Court is referred to as a "constitutional" tribunal because Congress has 
designated the Customs Court as a court established under Article III of the Constitution. 28 
u.s.c. § 251 (1970). 
2 Decisions of the Customs Court are reviewed by the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, 28 U .S.C. § 1541 ( 1970), whose decisions are subject to review upon certiorari by the 
Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1970). 
3 Sec text accompanying notes 180-198 infra. 
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focus on the procedures used in three representative areas: (1) 
those used to assess and collect import duties and taxes 4 on com-
mercial importations; (2) those used to insure that imported mer-
chandise meets safety and other regulatory standards; and (3) 
those used to assess and collect civil penalties, especially penalties 
under section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930.5 These subjects are the 
most important of the tasks assigned to Customs: they affect the 
largest number of people, consume the greatest amount of re-
sources, and embody the most significant fact-finding and regula-
tory functions.6 
OvERVIEw: THE NATURE oF THE CusToMs PROCESS 
Although the Customs Service was the first agency established by 
Congress/ customs administration is one of the least visible and 
least understood government functions. Few Americans have had 
any exposure to the customs process beyond, perhaps, a brief 
contact at the passport gate. Moreover, there is little published 
description of customs administration, congressional oversight has 
been sporadic, and, until recently,8 the field has been left virtually 
untouched by scholars. On the whole, there are few who under-
stand customs administration beyond those who are regularly in-
volved in the process-Customs personnel, importers, and a rela-
tively small number of customs brokers and lawyers specializing in 
customs matters. The system has been, and, to a large extent, still 
is, an insulated area, ingrown and relatively unaffected by devel-
opments in other fields. 
Customs implements-and at times formulates~an important 
part of the national public policy concerning international trade, 
4 Taxes collected by Customs on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service include excise 
taxes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4061-4227 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) and tobacco taxes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 
5701-5763, 251 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See generally OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, U.S. 
CusToMs SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, LAws AND REGULATIONS ENFORCED OR An-
MINISTERED BY THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE 26-J (Apr. 1975) .. 
5 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1970). 
6 This Article does not consider judicial review of actions taken under the Antidumping 
Act of 1921, 19 U .S.C. §§ 160-172 (Supp. V 1975) or the Countervailing Duty Act, 19 U .S.C. 
§ 1303 (Supp. V 1975), both of which are topics of great current concern. 
7 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, I Stat. 29 (repealed 1890). 
8 See E. RossmEs, U.S. CusTOMS, TARIFFS AND TRADE 71-193,405-420 (1977); R. STURM, 
A MANUAL OF CusToMs LAw ( 1974). A study prepared for the Attorney General's Committee 
on Administrative Procedure describes procedures used by the Customs Service but is 
somewhat dated. See 2 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDURE, . 
U.S. DEP'T OF jUSTICE, Ms)NOGRAPH No. 27, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CUSTOMS LAWS (1940). 
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our economic system, and public health and safety. By collecting 
import duties and taxes, by insuring that imported goods comply 
with regulatory standards, and by administering laws against "un-
fair" import competition, Customs has a direct impact on the price 
and availability of imported merchandise, on the safety and quality 
of imported products, and on the nature of import competition 
faced by U.S. firms and workers. 
Moreover, the importance of the policies Customs implements 
has paralleled the rapid expansion of international trade over the 
last two decades. Customs' workload has increased rapidly9 in both 
volume and significance as international trade has become a major 
soilrce of competitive stimulus-and thus potential injury-to U.S. 
businesses. As a result, the question of how Customs operates has 
assumed an increasingly greater importance. 
The Customs Service traditionally has not been viewed as a 
regulatory or administrative agency, and, until recently, has been 
virtually untouched by the developments in administrative proce-
dure of the past 50 years. Indeed, many Customs procedures 
descend from, or reflect, practices developed in the last century. Its 
operations invariably lack the procedural formalities often ob-
served by other regulatory agencies. Customs does not resolve 
disputes through hearings on the record before an impartial de-
cisionmaker, has no administrative law judges to take testimony 
under oath, and does not allow formal rebuttal of evidence relied 
upon in making decisions. 10 Instead, decisions may be reached 
without any articulated rationale, often on the basis of informal 
discussions between affected persons and Customs personnel, and 
sometimes on the basis of information which is not revealed to 
those adversely affected by the decision. 
Some of the procedures Customs uses may be required by the 
volume of work the Service performs. For example, Customs must 
process every importation of merchandise, which in fiscal year 
1976 amounted to more than 3 million individual import transac-
9 Customs Modernization Act and Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930: Hearings on H.R. 9220 
Before the Subcomrn. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways nnd Means, 94th Con g., 2d Sess. 37-99 
(1976) (testimony of David R. Macdonald)[hereinafter cited as Modernization Act Hearings]. 
Customs estimates that since 1950 entries of merchandise ha~e grown 336 percent, entries of 
vehicles have grown 236 percent, and entries of persons have grown by 199 percent. Id. at 
40. 
10 The single exception arises in connection with the revocation or suspension of the 
licenses of customs brokers, for which formal administrative hearings are provided. Sec note 
17 infra. 
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tions_II In order to make the administration of this and other 
functions workable, informality and- simplicity. may be necessary, 
and discretionary authority of Customs personnel may be unavoid-
able. , 
On the other hand, many of the procedures Customs uses today 
derive from those established when customs duties were the prin~ 
cipal source of government revenue.12 Procedures at 'that time 
were structured to protect the government's ability to collect reve-
nue, with maxi-mum emphasis on efficiency, simplicity, and collec-
tion, and minimum emphasis on procedural fairness or availability 
of review. 
Now Customs' revenue-raising function is only incidental; 
its primary function is to implement statutes regulating interna-
tional trade. Congress sets import duties and authorizes the Presi-
dent to negotiate changes in duties, not with a view toward the 
revenue they will produce, but on the basis of the impact that such 
duties are likely to have on domestic markets and industries. Like-
wise, when Customs keeps merchandise out of the country, ensures 
that imports !lleet product standards, or interprets and applies 
statutes governing competitive practices, it exercises a regulatory 
rather than a revenue-raising function. Thus, the basic function of 
Customs has shifted, and many of the administrative procedures 
that once may have been justified to protect the collection of reve-
nue are no longer appropriate for advancing the public interest 
that Customs now represents. 
Because the significance of Customs' role as a regulatory agency 
has grown, there is increasing interest in how·it performs its func-
tions. The Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means has formed a special task force to provide over-
sight of Customs administration13 and has held two sessions of 
hearings concerning customs modernization and the reform of 
11 U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PROLOGUE '76 30 (1976). 
12 In fact, for many decaqes after th,e establishment of the federal government customs 
revenue .constituted almost the entire source of federal income. Average annual customs 
receipts amounted to approximately 92.3 percent of the average annual federal revenue 
between 1800 and 1820, and· constituted over half of total U.S. revenue until the 1920's. See 
generally W. FuTRELL, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CusTOMS juRISPRUDENCE 29-56 (1941). 
Today, customs revenue constitutes less than 2 percent of all revenue collected. See U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE·, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, CoLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 1121 (bicentennial ed., pt. 2, 1975). 
13 Subcomm. on Trade of the House Cornm. on Ways and Means, Trade Press Release 
No.6 (Mar. 23, 1977). 
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monetary penalty provisions.14 A bill approved by Ways and Means 
would modernize some of the laws relating- to imports.15 In addi-
tion, the Customs Section of the Civil Division of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice is studying the jurisdiction and powers of the 
Customs Court over actions of the Customs Service and other 
agencies. 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AT THE CUSTOMS SERVICE 
Customs Organization 
:Most of t.~e work performed by the Customs Service is earned 
out by personnel at 3,000 stations within the 300 ports of entry 
designated by Congress and the Secetary of the Treasury as loca-
tions through which imported merchandise may enter the coun-
try.16 Customs employees at larger ports like New York City often 
have specialized responsibilities. Customs inspectors are responsible 
for examining imported merchandise and the vehicles, vessels, and 
planes used to transport that merchandise. Import specialists ascer-
tain the duties due on particular types of merchandise; for exam-
ple, an import specialist in consumer electronic products deter-
mines the duties due on all commercial importations of televisions, 
radios, phonogr<;~.phs, and similar merchandise. In this way, import 
specialists develop familiarity with regular importers, their mer-
chandise, and how the merchandise should be treated under the 
various laws and regulations enforced by the Service. Ports in a 
particular geographic area are encompassed within a customs dis-
trict under the supervision of a district director, who is generally 
the first to review disputed decisions made by personnel at the 
ports. There are forty-eight customs districts, each encompassed 
within one of nine customs regions under the direction of a re-
gional commissioner of Customs. 
At the apex of the organizational pyramid is the Customs Service 
14 See Modernization Act Hearings, supra note 9; Customs Procedural Refonn: Hearings on H_R. 
8149 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Con g., 1st Sess. 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Procedural Refonn Hearings]. 
15 H.R. 8149, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
16 Within each port there are usually numerous stations where Customs personnel process 
people or goods. There are approximately 160 stations on the U.S.-Canadian border, some 
manned by only one person. Temporary Customs stations also may be established ·to 
process nonrecurring imports such as those arising from lumbering operations near the 
border. See generally 19 C.F.R. § 101.1, 101.3, 101.5 (1977). 
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headquarters in Washington, D.C., which is headed by the Com-
missioner of Customs and divided into seven operating offices, 
each headed by an assistant commissioner. Substantive legal ques-
tions arising from Customs work are reviewed and generally de-
cided by the Office of Regulations and Rulings, which also promul-
gates Customs Regulations and administrative rulings and makes 
other substantive determinations. The Office of Operations over-
sees day-to-day operations at the ports by establishing inspection 
and processing procedures and training personnel. The Office of 
Investigations conducts investigations and gathers information 
needed to assess duties and carry out Customs enforcement func-
tions.· Two other offices, Administration and Internal Affairs, 
handle hiring, budgeting, and accounting matters and internal 
investigations and control. The Office of Enforcement Support was 
established in 1974 to aid in the prevention of fraud and smug-
gling. It is responsible for developing new technology and systems 
to. support Customs investigation and interdiction efforts. A 
seventh office, the Office of the Chief Counsel, provides legal 
advice to Customs organizations. It serves as liaison with the Cus-
toms Section of the qivil Division of the Department of Justice, 
which litigates cases before the Customs Court, and with U.S. 
attorneys, who ·litigate Customs cases before district courts. 
Merchandise Processing 
1. Overview 
Processing of imported merchandise by Customs involves two 
initial steps: examination and release of the merchandise, and 
entry. If the·importer has ob~ained a special permit for immediate 
delivery, merchandise is examined and released by Customs under 
bond as soon as it is importedY Within 10 days after the mer-
17 Many importers hire a customhouse broker as their agent to clear merchandise through 
the customs process. Because of the important role they play, brokers are themselves the 
subject of regulatory controls administered by Customs: Customs determines the qual-
ifications and responsibilities of brokers, administers examinations, issues licenses (and has 
authority to revoke or suspend licenses), and determines what functions may be undertaken 
by nonlicensed brokers or agents. See 19 U.S.C. § 1641 (1970); 19 C.F.R. § Ill (1977). 
Revocation or suspension of a broker's license follows a formal hearing before the district 
director of Customs under procedures consistent with § 554 (adjudications), § 557 (deci-
sions), and § 558 (revocation of licenses) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 
554, 557, 558. See 19 C.F.R. § 111.62-.74 (1976). The decision of the district director is 
subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury whose decision is reviewable by a court of 
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chandise is released, the importer or his agent must complete the 
requirements for entry-submission (and acceptance by Customs) 
of required documents and payment of duties and import taxes 
estimated to be due on the merchandise. If the importer has not 
obtained a special permit for immediate delivery, the steps are 
taken in reverse order: the entry procedures are completed and 
then the merchandise is examined and released. 
After these two steps have been completed, the import 
specialist "liquidates" the entry by determining the amount of 
duties and ta,xes actually due on the merchandise, 18 and either 
sends the importer a bill for additional charges owed or remits any 
overpayment. Thereafter, the importer has 90 days to protest the 
liquidation by filing a written statement. H after informal adminis-
trative reconsideration, a protest is denied by Customs, the impor-
ter may file a summons in the Customs Court challenging the 
decision. 
2. Immediate Delivery Privileges 
Over 80 percent of all import transactions are processed under 
special permits for immediate delivery. 19 Such a permit allows the 
importer to take delivery of the merchandise as soon as it is exam-
ined and released by Customs, before he tenders the entry docu-
ments and estimated duties to Customs. The importer must then 
complete the entry procedures within l 0 days. 20 Such procedures 
benefit the Customs Service, importers, and brokers, because they 
allow the physical inspection of merchandise to proceed indepen-
dent of the documentary inspection (entry). For Customs, this 
reduces congestion on the docks and alleviates pressures to expe-
dite review of entry documents; for importers and brokers, it 
allows merchandise to be received quickly. 
Special permits for immediate delivery, issued to irnporters and 
b 1 h l' . d" . 1 '. ro.ozers "-'Y c~Istrict 'l_ 1rectors, may cover a parUcLHar s111p111ent or a11 
entire class of merchandise to be imported for up to one year. 21 The 
standards for issuing them are imprecise. Permits may be issued: 
appeals. !9 U.S.C. § !64!(b) (1970). See, e.g., Twigger v. Schultz, 484 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 
!973). 
18 Liquidation is defined in the Customs regulations as the "flnal computation or ascer-
tainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an entry." 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 ( 1977). 
19 Immediate delivery privileges are authorized by 19 U.S.C. § !448(b) (1970) and admin-
istered under regulations in 19 C.F.R. § 142 (1977). 
'" !9 C.F.R. § 142.11 (1977). If the merchandise is subject to a quota the time period 
within which entry must be completed may be shorter. ld. 
01 Jd. § !42.3. 
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for perishable merchandise and any other merchandise 
for which delivery can be permitted with safety to the 
revenue, when immediate release of SlJch merchandise is 
necessary to avoid unusual loss or inconvenience to the 
importer or to the carrier bringing the merchandise to the 
port, or more effectively to utilize Customs manpower or 
to eliminate or reduce congestion.22 
Although this. regulation seems to. put the burden on 'the applicant 
to show that the conditions for granting the permit exist, in prac-
tice permits are issued routinely unless the district director believes 
that issuance would impair the safety of the revenue. 23 There are 
no procedures for challenging a refusal to issue a permit or for 
review of such a decision. . 
Special permits may be discontinued or suspended by a district 
director. Discontinuance may result if an importer "has repeatedly 
failed to make timely entry without sufficient justification" or has 
"not taken prompt action to settle a claim foL liquidated damages" 
imposed for failing to make timely entry.24 No procedures govern 
the discontinuance of special permits. Suspension may result if the 
importer "is substantially or habitually delinquent [in paying] Cus-
toms bills."25 Suspension is governed by the following procedures: 
the importer is given notice by a customs region that he is "sub-
stantially and .habitually delinquent," and that his permit has been 
suspended in that region. Thereafter, if the importer pays all bills 
on which he is delinquent, the suspension is lifted; if he does not, 
his immediate delivery privileges are suspended in every other 
customs region. There are no procedures by which a suspension or 
22 ld. § 142.1. 
23 The regulations are imprecise because Congress has never sanctioned .. the use of 
immediate delivery privileges on a wide scale. When the statute authorizing immediate 
delivery was passed it was th~ practice first to review and accept the entry docufuents and 
estimated duties, and then to inspect the merchandise. Permits for immediate delivery were 
to be "special" for "perishable articles and other articles, the immediate delivery of which is 
necessary." 19 U.S.C. § 1448(b) (1970). Since importation has increased so greatly, these 
permits are now the rule rather than the exception. 
24 19 C.F.R. § 142.7(a) (1977). If the importer or broker does not make timely entry he 
has breached one of the provisions of the bond covering the importation, and Customs may 
assert a claim for the liquidated damages specified in the bond. The "action to settle a claim" 
referred to in the regulation is either payment of the claim or a petition seeking relief from 
the claim. See text accompanying note 109 infra. Such action is considered "prompt" if it is 
taken within the time specified in the claim. 
25 19 C.F.R. § 142.7(b) (1977). There is no regulation defining the term "substantially or 
habitually delinquent." 
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discontinuance may be appealed or otherwise reviewed within the 
Customs Service. 
The standards under which permits can be discontinued or sus-
pended are imprecise. Because they are applied at the district or 
region level, there is a danger of inconsistency. For example, there 
is controversy concerning when entry is "time1y."26 To be timely, 
the entry procedures must be completed within 10 days after mer-
chandise is released; completion requires acceptance of the entry 
documentation by Customs.27 If an importer submits entry docu-
ments on the first day after release of the merchandise but the 
documents are returned to him by Customs for correction on the 
ninth day, it may be impossible to resubmit them for acceptance by 
the tenth day. Some district directors apparently treat this as un-
timely entry, while others consider entry to be timely as long as the 
corrected documents are resubmitted within a reasonable period. 
Issues such as these are currently being litigated in a district court 
m 1llinois.28 
3. Examination and Release 
Coniroi over imponed merchandise from the moment the mer-
chandise arrives at a port is an important enforcement power 
giving Customs the opportunity to examine the merchandise and 
v;ithl1old its release if it does not comply vvitl1 regulatory standards. 
Examination of merchandise yields information used in assessing 
duties, reveals vvhether tl1e entry documents accurately describe tl1e 
quantity and quality of merchandise, insures that each product is 
properly marked to show the country of origin, and permits as-
sessment of compliance with other regulatory standards. Because 
of the volume of imports and inadequate staffing, however, 
thorough inspection is often not possible. Only rarely do Customs 
inspectors even count the items of merchandise to insure that the 
correct quantity has been dedared. 29 
In some cases, specialized examination may be required if infor-
26 The issue is important because untimely entry may lead to discontinuance of immediate 
delivery privileges and to claims for liquidated damages under a bond. See note 22 supra. 
27 See text accompanying notes 34-35 infra. 
26 Gallagher and Ascher Co. v. Simon, No. 76-C-3499 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 12, 1 976) (suit 
to enjoin district director from suspending permit). 
26 The process of examination and release normally takes very little time; it is generally 
completed within a day or two after the merchandise arrives and is sometimes completed 
within a matter of hours. 
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mation is needed to determine duties or if the merchandise is sub-
ject to regulatory controls. For example, imported sugar is subject 
to a "polariscopic test," flat glass must be weighed, and imported 
petroleum ·must be tested to determine its API gravity at 60 de~ 
grees Fahrenheit. Customs has established procedures for deter-
mining such facts, often relying upon analysis by its own laborato-
ries or by independent testing agencies licensed for this purpose.30 
More thorough and particularized in,spection may be necessary to 
determine whether merchandise complies with other regulatory 
statutes. Imported books and movies may be read or screened to 
determine if they are "obscene;"31 knives may be examined to 
assure they are not prohibited "switchblade knives."32. 
If the regulatory standards applicable to a particular product are 
interpreted and applied by another agency, Customs will normally 
coordinate its activities with the agency involved. Such inter-agency 
action takes many forms and involves agencies as diverse as the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. 
After Customs obtains the information it needs and determines 
that merchandise should be allowed into the country, the shipment 
is released to the importer. However, Customs retains control over 
the merchandise because the importer's bond covering it guaran-
tees that the goods will be redelivered to Customs upon demand. A 
liquidated damage amount, up to the value of the bond, is recover-
able by Customs if the merchandise is not so returned. Customs' 
power to reacquire physical control over the merchandise-under 
threat of liquidated penalties-is an important enforcement tool. 33 
4. Entry 
Through the entry procedure Customs ensures that required 
documents are adequately and accurately completed, determines 
whether the merchandise is admissible to the country, and collects 
3° For example, Customs has licensed "public gaugers" whose reports concerning the 
properties of imported petroleum products are accepted by Customs as accurate. See 19 
C.F.R. § 151.43 (1977). Procedures governing the examination of sugar are contained in 19 
C.F.R. § 151.21-.31 (1977). Those pertaining to flat glass are contained in 19 C.F.R. § 
15l.l 01 (1977). 
31 See note 83 infra and accompanying text. 
32 See'15 U.S.C. § 1241 (1970). 
33 Procedures invoked when Customs demands the redelivery of merchandise or attempts 
to collect liquidated penalties for failure to redeliver the merchandise upon demand are 
discussed in text accompanying notes 108-10 infra. 
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estimated duties and taxes on the merchandise.3~ To complete entry, 
the importer (or his agent) submits entry papers to the local cus-
tomhouse for approval.35 If the documents are found to be in 
order, they are reviewed by the import specialist, who determines 
whether the declaration of estimated duties and taxes is accurate. 
He will refuse to accept the entry papers if the importer incorrectly 
calculated estimated duties or taxes or if other information is er-
roneous or missing. For example, if the import specialist believes 
that the classification the importer used to determine the rate of 
duty is incorrect, he may require estimated duties to be recalcu-
lated before he accepts the entry papers. The import specialist does 
not make a final decision concerning the amount of duties and 
taxes due; his function is to screen the entry to ensure that, given 
the information then available to him, the estimated duties and 
taxes appear to be calculated correctly. 
Importers usually do not contest the import specialist's calcula-
tion of estimated duties or taxes at this stage of the process, since 
there are no established procedures for doing so. Therefore, if the 
import specialist refuses to accept the entry papers, the importer 
corrects and resubmits them. At a later date, the importer may 
challenge such a determination and, if successful, receive a refund 
of overpaid duties and taxes. 
,., The text here describes "consumption entries," which allow the importer to receive the 
merchandise as soon as it is inspected and released by Customs. Over 80 percent of all 
entries are of this type. If the importer does not want the merchandise immediately, or, in 
some instances, if the merchandise is to be remanufactured or exported, the importer may 
make a "warehouse entry." In that case, the merchandise is inspected and stored in a bonded 
warehouse, but estimated duties on the merchandise are not paid until· the merchandise is 
withdrawn from the warehouse by the importer. See 19 C.F.R. § 144 (1977). For such 
purposes, Customs has established regulations for licensing and bonding warehouses. Jd. 
§ 19.1-.49. 
Simplified entry procedures have been established for noncommercial importations. "Ap-
praisement entry" is used for damaged merchandise, personal gifts, household effects, and 
certain other classes of merchandise, and may be authorized by the Commissioner of 
Customs in other instances. See id. § 143.11-.16. "Informal entries," which are made by 
most returning tourists, are used for shipments valued at less than $250, for household or 
personal effects or tools of trade entitled to free entry, for certain books imported by 
libraries, and for certain other types of merchandise. See id. § 143.21-.28. 
35 Entry papers include proof that the importer has the right to receive the goods (e.g., a 
bill of lading); documents containing information needed to determine duties (a commercial 
invoice, a copy of the Special Customs Invoice, packing lists); in some instances, proof that 
the merchandise is admissible to the country (e.g., a certificate required by another federal 
agency); and a document showing a declaration of duties and taxes (usually a Consumption 
Entry). Under some circumstances, the import specialist or the district director may waive 
the requirement that particular documents be submitted. Id. § 141.92. 
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5. Customs Bonds 
Customs bonds provide a means by which Customs, without 
holding imported merchandise or resorting to a lengthy collection 
process, can ensure that the interests it is mandated to protect are 
protected. District directors approve bonds and determine the 
amount in which they must be fiJed. 36 
The three general bonds used most frequently with respect to 
imported merchandise are: (1) the general term bond; (2) the im-
mediate delivery and consumption entry bond (term); and (3) the 
immediate delivery and consumption entry bond (single entry). 
Most importers maintain either a general term or an immediate 
delivery (term) bond. Customs brokers are not permitted to file a 
general term bond, and generally maintain a term immediate de-
livery bond. Under an, immediate delivery and consumption entry 
bond, (either term or single entry),117 an importer or broker prom-
ises, among other things: to complete entry within 10 days after 
release of the merchandise; to deposit estimated duties with the 
entry; to redeliver the merchandise to Customs upon demand; to 
pay duties which become due after Lhe merchandise is liquidated; 
and to file additional documents requested by Customs.38 A person 
filing a general term bond agrees to the same conditions, and may 
agree to several others concerning matters such as merchandise 
36 The district directors are to approve bonds "if satisfied that the amowlt is sufficient, the 
bond is in proper form and [a related form] has been properly completed." U.S. CusToMs 
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CusTOMS MANUAL CM-139 to -140, CM-!40 (15th rev. 
Oct. !976) [hereinafter cited as CusToMs MANUAL]. See also19 C.F.R. § 113.15 (1977). 
The general term bond is generally equal to 10 percent of duties and taxes which the 
importer paid in the immediately preceding year in that district or (if no such duties and 
taxes were paid) I 0 percent of the amount of duties and taxes which the importer estimates 
he will incur in the coming year (rounded to the nearest one hundred thousand dollars). 
CusTOMS MANUAL, supra at CM-140. If current charges against the bond threaten to be 
larger than the amount of the bond, the district director may require the importer, as a 
condition of continued importation, to deposit supplementary duties, or file a larger bond, a 
superseding bond, or a single entry bond covering each new importation. The amount of the 
immediate delivery and consumption entry bond is determined on the basis of the amount 
and frequency of the charges the district director believes will be incurred against the bond 
and the speed with which those charges are likely to be discharged by liquidation and the 
payment of duties. The single entry bond is equal to the value of the imported merchandise 
(as determined at the time of entry) plus the estimated duties and taxes on the merchandise. 
37 A term bond covers ·all importations within a single year. A single entry bond covers 
only a particular entry. 
38 Riders may be added to the bonds to cover special contingencies-for example, the 
deferred payment of Internal Revenue Service taxes. See CusTOMS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 
CM-140. 
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entered temporarily (as for repairs), transportation of merchandise 
in bond to another port for inspection, ;nd warehouse entries. 39 
There are no writt~n procedures for challenges to, or review of, 
decisions the district director makes with respect to bonds. If an 
importer or broker believes that the amount of the bond or other 
bond requirements are incorrect, his only remedy is to seek a 
reversal of the decision from the regional director or Customs 
headquarters; however, reversals rarely occur. 40 
Ascertaining Duties and Taxes 
Following entry and release of merchandise, Customs must 
liquidate the entry by determining whether the importer paid the 
correct duties and taxes at the time of entry. This article discusses 
some of the substantive issues involved in ascertaining import 
duties and taxes, and then describes the procedures leading to 
liquidation and subsequent judicial reVIew. 
1. Substantive Issues 
The assessment of duties and taxes involves both factual and 
legal issues. First, the imported merchandise is classified into one of 
the more than 6,700 descriptive product categories in the Tariff 
Schedules established by Congress.41 The Tariff Schedules show 
the rate of duty to be coilected~on products in each category, either 
a specific rate (e.g., 10 cents a dozen), an ad valorem rate (e.g., 10 
percent of "value"), or a combination of both. Classification deci-
sions are of crucial significance for the importer, because they 
establish the rate of duty to be paid.42 
Customs must also appraise the merchandise by determining the 
value of the product under one of several standards established by 
Congress.43 Because those standards are extremely complicated, 
'"' Jd . 
. Jo Procedures for enforcing the provisions of a bond are discussed at text accompanying 
notes 108~110, infra. 
'" Description of the principles used to classify merchandise are set out in E. RossmEs, 
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TARIFFS AND TRADE ~l.~~J20 (1977); 
Feller, An Introduction to Tariff Classification, 8 LAw & PoL'Y !NT'L Bus. 99! (1976), and R. 
STURM, A MANUAL OF CusToMs LAw 145~399 (1974). 
·'
2 See, e.g., Schmidt, Pritchard Sc Co. v. United States, 10 CusT. BuLL. 35, 36 (1976). 
There the issue was whether certain wire rod coiling equipment should be classified as 
"metal working machine tools" taxable at 15 percent ad valorem, or as "machines for working 
metal, not otherwise provided for," taxable at l 0 percent ad valorem. 
·•• The standards of valuation are contained in !9 U.S.C. §§ l401(a), 1402 (1970). 
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appraisement determinations often involve complex statutory in-
terpretation and intricate factual issues.44 
In addition to classification and appraisement, many aspects of 
duty assessment raise complex questions. For example, imported 
merchandise assembled in a foreign country from components 
fabricated in the United States is entitled to an allowance for the 
cost or value of the components, but only if the components were 
exported in a state ready for assembly without further fabrication, 
have not lost their physical identity, and have not been advanced in 
value or improved in condition abroad except through assembly.45 
Customs personnel regularly make similarly difficult determina-
tions.46 
2. Procedures for Ascertaining Duties and Taxes 
a. Liquidation 
The import specialist uses informal procedures to determine 
whether the estimated duties and taxes paid by the importer were 
correctly computed. The scope of his investigation depends on the 
product involved, the standards to be applied in determining value, 
the prior experience he or other specialists have had with similar 
products, and the extent to which he relies upon the information 
supplied by the importer on the entry documents. The import 
specialist's task, although complex, is facilitated in several ways. 
The import specialist has "no obligation to compile a record or 
verify information upon which he relies. Unless challenged, he 
need not demonstrate the accuracy of his decisions to any impartial 
decision-maker. Indeed, the import specialist need only "estimate" 
the value of the merchandise "by all reasonable ways and means,"47 
and even if ultimately challenged in the Customs Court, the deci-
sion is supported by a presumption that it is correct. 48 
44 See generally, SENATE COMM. ON fiNANCE, 93o CONG., 1sT SESS., REPORT ON CUSTOMS 
VALUATION 61-81 (Comm. Print 1973). 
45 See Item 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, sch. 8, 
pt. 1 subpt. B (1970). Similarly, Item 806.30 provides for reduced valuation for articles of 
metal manufactured in the United States, exported for further processing and then im-
ported for still further processing. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, sch. 8, pt. 1, subpt. A (1970). 
'
16 See, e.g., I 9 U .S.C. § I3 I 3 (I 970) (drawbacks of duty paid on re-exported materials), I 9 
U .S.C. §§ 1506 and I 563 (I 970) (allowances for abandoned or damaged property), 19 U .S.C. 
§ 1558 (1970) (refunds for exported or destroyed merchandise); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4061-4227, 
5701-5763 (1970)(import taxes imposed under the Internal Revenue Code). 
47 19 U.S.C. § 1500(a) (1970). 
48 28 U .S.C. § 2635(a) (1970). 
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The import specialist has a number of sources to guide his 
treatment of relevant issues. Substantive decisions of Customs in 
the form of notices, letters, and rulings are circulated to all ports 
through a format known as the Customs Information Exchange. 
Much of the information supplied to import specialists through the 
Exchange is not published or otherwise disseminated to the public 
unless it is voluntarily disclosed by an import specialist or released 
under a Freedom of Information Act request. The import 
specialist, either on his own or at the importer's request, may ask· 
the Office of Regulations and Rulings to give advice on specific 
substantive issues that arise.49 National import specialists in New 
York City act as Customs' repository and clearinghouse for data 
pertaining to individual products or individual markets, including 
records of how products have be:en dealt with at various ports, and 
can give guidance on the basis of such data. 
For some appraisements, especially those involving the determi-
nation of foreign value or cost of production, the import specialist 
may gather additional information or verify that provided by the 
importer. All information supplied by the importer is subject to 
verification by Customs agents, who can obtain access to the rec-
ords of the importer or his foreign supplier for such purposes. 50 
In some instances, Customs will undertake a so-called "foreign 
investigation," having Customs agents overseas obtain information 
necessary for the ascertainment of duties.51 Copies of reports re-
sulting from such investigations are available to importers only 
through discovery procedures incident to a Customs Court pro-
ceeding.52 
49 19 C.F.R. § I77.ll (1977). 
50 I 9 U .S.C. § 1509 (l 970). If an importer denies Customs information which is pertinent 
to value or classification determinations, Customs can prohibit the r.elevant importation, 
withhold delivery of merchandise, and, if the denial continues for a year, sell the withheld 
merchandise at public auction. Id. § 1511 (1970). Customs also has authority. to require 
importers to appear and testify under oath. !d. § 1509 (l 970). Interestingly, Customs has no 
authority to compel those involved in importation to keep books and records relating to 
importations, a defect which would be remedied by H.R. 8194 and H.R. 8367, 95th Cong., 
lst Sess. (I 977). 
51 There are no published regulations governing the conduct of such investigations; they 
are informal and the report of the agent making the investigation is the only form of record. 
In most cases, importers who desire to do so are permitted to participate in investigations of 
their foreign suppliers. However, if the importer is not informed by the supplier, he may 
remain unaware of the investigation until the information gathered in the investigation is 
used to appraise his merchandise. 
52 Such reports are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. See 
I 9 C.F.R. § l 03 .I O(g) (l 977). 
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If through such means the import specialist determines that the 
importer's estimated duties and taxes were correct, the merchan-
dise is liquidated "as entered," and 8ustoms procedures with re-
spect to that importation generally are complete. Approximately 85 
percent of all entries are liquidated in this manner. 5 3 If the import 
specialist determines that the estimated duties and taxes were too 
high, the merchandise is liquidated at the correct amount, and the 
excess payment refunded to the importer. If the estimated duties 
and taxes were too low, the merchandise is liquidated at the higher 
amount, and the importer is billed for the difference.54 
As mentioned earlier, the standards to classify and value goods 
are complex and extremely 'difficult to apply, so disputes do arise 
between Customs and importers. Such disputes may be disposed of 
informally, either before or after liquidation. 
If the importer believes that the estimated duties he paid were 
determined incorrectly, he might attempt to have disputed issues 
resolved through informal administrative procedures prior to 
liquidation. Typically, the importer would first speak to the import 
specialist who made the disputed decision. If the import specialist 
refused to change the decision, the issue might be raised with 
the import specialist's immediate supervisor, the district director, 
or the national import specialist in New York City. Alternatively, 
the importer might request that the import specialist seek a ruling 
from the Office of Regulations and Rulings in Washington under 
the internal advice procedure,55 in which case that office may issue 
a letter ruling, settling the issue. 
Should the importer decide to abandon the informal approach, 
the goods would be liquidated and the importer given the oppor-
tunity to seek further administrative review by protesting the liqui-
dation, and ultimately to seek review in the Customs Court. 
Even if the importer raises no issues prior to the liquidation, the 
import specialist may do so. He may ask the importer to correct 
clerical errors or make noncontroversial changes in the entry 
document or may issue a "notice of tentative liquidation" informing 
53 Letter from Leonard Lehman, Assistant Commissioner of Customs for Regulations and 
Rulings, to author (Aug. 26, 1976) (on file with the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, Washington, D.C., and at office of Law and Policy in International Business). 
54 The liquidation actually is approved by the district director of the port involved, but 
rarely with more than pro forma review unless a disputed issue has already been brought to 
his attention. Decisions of the district director are often m.ade by his staff under his 
supervision. ,. 
55 S~e 19 C.F.R. § I77.II(b) (2) (1977) 
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the importer of a tentative decision to require additional duties and 
giving the importer an opportunity to challenge the tentative de-
termination. The importer then may discuss the matter with the 
import specialist and seek an informal resolution through the im-
port specialist's superiors. Again, final liquidation is geneni.lly post-
poned until these informal procedures have run their course.56 
The length of the liquidation process varies greatly. Many deci-
sions are routine, based upon established precedent or information 
supplied by the importer. Because of the volume of work there are 
pressures to process entries quickly without raising controversy .57 
However, there is no time period within which liquidation must be 
completed. When disputes do arise, or when the determinations 
made by Customs are complex, liquidation often does not occur 
until long after the goods have been entered. 
b. Protests 
After liquidation is completed, the importer must pay any addi-
tional duties, but he then may seek review of contested issues by 
filing a protest-a written statement setting forth arguments and 
evidence to refute the determinations made in the liquidation.58 
The protest, which must be filed within 90 days of liquidation,59 is 
an important procedural step, since protests control access to the 
Customs Court; no suit may be brought in the Customs Court until 
after a protest has been filed and denied by Customs.60 
After receiving a protest, the import specialist reviews the issues 
raised and submits a memorandum to the district director outlining 
the facts and the basis of the liquidation. The district director, after 
considering the import specialist's report and the protest, may 
request further information and, although he is not required to do 
56 Notice of final liquidation is given by posting the notice on a customhouse bulletin 
board at the port of entry, not by mailing it to the importer. 19 C.F.R. § 159.9 ( 1977). If the 
importer does not receive a refund of duties or a bill for additional duties, he may never 
receive personal notice that liquidation has been completed. 
57 The 1200 import specialists collectively liquidated over three million formal entries in 
fiscal year 1975. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PROLOGUE '76 33 (1976). 
58 Liquidations that have not beeen protested within the prescribed period are final, 
although they may be corrected for clerical errors, mistakes of fact, or other inadvertance 
not amounting to an error in the construttion of a law or, in certain circumstances, 
reliquidated on account of fraud. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1520(c), 1521 (1970). 
59 Id. § !514(b)(2) (1970). 
60 Unless a request for accelerated disposition is filed, Customs has up to 2 years to review 
a protest. 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1970). When a request for accelerated disposition is filed, the 
protest is deemed to be denied unless acted on within 30 days. 19 C.F.R. § 174.22 (1977). 
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so, may give the importer an opportunity to discuss the issues 
informally. If uncertain of how to resolve the issues, he may seek 
advice either from the regional commissioner, the national import 
specialist in New York City, or the Office of Regulations and 
Rulings in Washington. 
In some instances a protesting party may seek review of the 
protest by higher authority than the district -director. This is possi-
ble: if the challenged decision is allegedly inconsistent with a ruling 
of the Commissioner of Customs or with a decision in any district 
concerning the same or substantially similar merchandise; if the 
protest raises a question of law or fact not yet ruled on by the 
Commissioner of Customs or his designee or by the courts; if the 
protest, although subject to a prior ruling, raises -facts or legal 
arguments not previously considered; or if the protesting party 
had previously applied for, but had been denied, internal advice 
under Customs internal advice procedures.61 
A protesting party seeking such review files an application for 
further review with the district director. If the district director 
determines that the claim is valid, he allows the protest (i.e., re-
verses the liquidation). If he believes the protest should be denied, 
he forwards the protest and application to the regional commis-
sioner for his district, who determines at what level further review 
should take place.62 If the protest involves a "strictly factual issue" 
or if it "clearly" should be allowed under a specific ruling from 
headquarters, the regional commissioner will decide the issue,63 but 
any other issue will be forwarded to the Office of Regulations and 
Rulings for a decision.64 If the protest is denied, the importer may 
seek Customs Court review of the issues raised by the protest.65 
Regardless of who the ultimate decision-maker is, the procedures 
used by Customs in ruling on protests are informal. Neither evi-
61 19 C.F.R. § 174.23 (1977). 
62 U.S. CuSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, fUNDAMENTALS OF DUTY ASSESSMENT 
8-11 (2d rev. June 1973). 
63 Jd. 
64 ld. The regulations in 19 C.F.R. § 174.26 (1977) articulate the division of reviewing 
. authority between the regional commissioner and Customs Headquarters by listing the issues 
to be determined by Headquarters (the Office of Regulations and Rulings) and leaving other 
decisions to the regional commissioner. 
65 In fiscal year 1975, 57,012 protests were filed; 76 percent of these were denied by 
Customs, of which less than I percent were challenged in the Customs Court. Letter from 
Leonard Lehman, Assistant Commissioner of Customs for Regulations and Rulings, to 
author (Aug. 26, 1976) (on file with the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Washington, D.C.). 
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dence nor argument is preserved on a record, nor is there an 
impartial decision-maker. Decisions may be based on i"1formation 
which is not disclosed to the importer. Decisions need not be, and 
generally are not, supported by a written explanation, although in 
some cases the importer may receive a written or oral explanation. 
More often, the importer receives only a notice that the protest is 
granted or denied. 
Customs has up to two years in which to act on the protest. An 
importer may, however, apply for accelerated disposition of a pro-
• 1-.. _.] r 1 ~ •. ("'1 1 • test at any time more tuan 90 uays a1ter tne proteSL IS n1ea, In 
which event the protest is deemed denied unless it is acted on 
within 30 days. 66 If the protest is denied, the importer may seek 
Customs Court review of the issues raised by the protest. 
c. Internal Audits 
The decision of the import specialist concerning classification 
and value generally is not reviewed unless the importer involved 
questions it. Procedures do exist, however, to identify and correct 
erroneous decisions that favor, and are thus not questioned by, the 
importer. There a:re at least two ways-one formal and one 
informal-in which erroneous decisions may be corrected. 
Informally, incorrect determinations that favor an importer may 
be detected if Customs recognizes that inconsistent determinations 
concerning similar merchandise are being made at different ports. 
This may OCClJ_r, for example, if tl1e natio11al in1port specialist in 
New York City recognizes such inconsistent treatment in the course 
of reviewing information concerning individual importations. 
There is no guarantee that inconsistencies will be detected in this 
way, and Customs apparently has no workable formal procedures 
for systematically reviewing the treatment given to imports at the 
various ports. The danger may exist that some importers will 
"shop" between ports until they find one which gives their mer-
chandise favorable treatment. The Customs Information Ex-
change67 is an attempt to obviate this possibility. 
d. Review at Request rf U.S. Companies 
A more formal mechanism for detecting and correcting incorrect 
decisions is provided by infrequently used provisions permitting 
66 19 C.F.R. § 174.22 (1977). 
67 See generally text accompanying note 49 supra. 
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U.S. companies, under certain circumstances, to challenge Customs 
decisions concerning duties on merchandise imported by others.68 
Under these procedures a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or 
wholesaler may request information from Customs concerning the 
duty imposed on particular imports and may file a petition with 
Customs alleging that the correct duty has not been assessed. How-
ever, the request for information and the petition may be "filed only 
with respect to merchandise of the same class or kind as that dealt 
in by the U.S. company. If the petitioner is dissatisfied with Cus-
toms' response to his petition, he may contest the decision by filing 
an action in the Customs Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction 
over such actions.69 As with protests, Customs procedures for 
handling such petitions are informal-the petitioner may be given 
an opportunity to meet with th,€n:elevant decision-maker and may 
present evidence, but he is not given a hearing on the record, an 
articulated basis for the decision, or an opportunity to examine 
confidential information relied upon in making the decision. 
There is no similar mechanism by which importers can challenge 
Customs decisions made with respect to the merchandise imported 
by others, and importers have been denied the right to challenge 
such action in a district court. 70 
e. Administrative Rulings 
One other aspect of Customs procedure is relevant to the duty 
assessment process. Because of the many complex issues arising 
under trade laws, and because importers, exporters, and others 
often need to know how such issues will be resolved before they 
engage in trade transactions, Customs provides interested persons 
with a procedure for seeking an administrative ruling on an issue 
arising under the laws administered by Customs. 71 Such a ruling 
may be given if the issue is prospective (i.e., not already raised in 
the course of Customs processing), is not hypothetical, and all facts 
needed to make the ruling are supplied. 
Once given, a ruling is binding on Customs with respect to the 
68 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970). Regulations governing the procedures are contained in 19 
C.F.R. § 175 (1977). . 
69 28 U .S.C. § 1582(b) (I 970). 
7° Kocher v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,391 U.S. 920 (1968) (district 
court has no jurisdiction to compel Customs to collect duties from competitor, even though 
plaintiff has no recourse through the Customs Court). 
71 19 C.F.R. § 177 (1977). 
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transaction involved (provided thal the actual facts do not differ 
from those on which the ruling was based) and is considered to be 
authority governing similar transactions. Rulings thought to affect 
a substantial volume of imports or transactions or to be otherwise 
of general interest are pub-lished in the Customs Bidletin and, upon 
publication, become established Customs practice. 72 However, if a 
ruling changes prior practices and would result in increased duties 
or import restrictions, or is thought to be of general interest to the 
domestic industry, a Federal Register notice is published to give 
interested persons an opportunity to comment on the :ruling. 73 
There is no procedure for pre-enforcement judicial review of ad-
ministrative rulings, but any ruling may be chalienged as applied to 
particular import tr3..!-:tsactions. 
Prohibited Imports 
The Customs Service is the agency primarily responsible for 
keeping prohibited merchandise out of the country and ensuring 
that imported merchandise meets regulatory standards.74 In 
fulfilling this role, Customs enforces a large variety of statutes. 
Some require Customs to decide whether imported merchandise 
meets regulatory standards; under others, Customs merely en-
forces a determination made by personnel of another agency. 
There is an important distinction bet\veen exclusion of mer-
chandise pursuant to a customs law and exclusion of merchandise 
pursuant to a law that is not a customs law. Exclusion action taken 
pursuant to a customs law is generally reviewable only in the 
Customs Court; exclusion action pursuant to a law that is not a 
customs law is not reviewable in the Customs Court, but may be 
reviewed in a district court. Unfortunately, no definition clearly 
distinguishes between a customs law and other laws pursuant to 
72 !d. § 177.1 O(a)-(b) ( 1977). An increase in a rate of duty or charge under an established 
and uniform practice may not become effective without 30 days public notice. 19 U.S.C. 
§ l315(d) (1970). 
73 19 C.F.R. § 177.IO(c) (1977). Customs does not provide a formal hearing when consid-
ering administrative rulings, but interested persons who know of the ruling may be given an 
opportunity to present their views .orally or in writing./d. § 177 .I, 177 .4. An importer may 
also request a district director to furnish advice concerning valuation of merchandise to be 
entered later. However, unlike administrative rulings, such advice is not binding on Customs 
during actual appraisement of the merchandise. Jd. § 152.26. 
71 Although it is an important part of Customs' work, Customs action which results in the 
exclusion of merchandise from the United States is rarely su~jected to challenge in the 
Customs Court. Less than I percent of all protests filed are to challenge such action. 
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which merchandise is excluded.75 An importer who seeks review of 
an exclusion decision in the wrong court may find his case dis-
missed.76 
1. Substantive Issues 
a. Imports Prohibited Under Customs Law 
An import quota is a control on the quantity of merchandise that 
may be brought into the country during a specified period (usually 
one year). Absolute quotas prohibit any importation of merchan-
dise above the quota amount and generally apply to specific prod-
ucts from designated countries. Tariff rate quotas provide for an 
increased rate of duty on imports after a specified amount of 
covered merchandise has been imported. 
Although quotas are usually established by other governmental 
entities,77 Customs may be required to determine the amount of 
the quota 78 and must determine whether an import comes within a 
particular quota category.79 Customs attempts to ensure that quotas 
are administered fairly: ideally, no importer should be given undue 
preference, importers should be able to predict into which quota 
category their product will fall, and information concerning the 
amount of merchandise imported under each quota category 
should be disseminated quickly enough to permit importers to 
75 Generally, customs laws are those codified in Title 19 of the United States Code or 
those applicable to imported but not to domestically produced merchandise. Other laws 
under which merchandise is excluded are not customs laws. This general distinction is drawn 
from the cases cited in notes 142-43 (cases in the Customs Court) and 183-86 (cases in the 
district courts) infra. Although there is no authority on this point, seizures under the 
obscenity statute, 19 U .S.C. § 1303 ( 1970), are probably best construed to be under a law that 
is not a customs law; they are actions taken on the advice of U.S. attorneys under standards 
applicable to both domestic and imported merchandise. 
76 See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the Implementation 
of Textile Agreements, No. 76-1064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1977), petition for rehearing denied, 
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1977). 
77 Quotas may be established by Congress, by an executive department (e.g., the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, 7 U .S.C. §II 00 (1970)), or the President upon advice of an agency. See 
19 U.S.C. § 225I(b) (Supp. V 1975). See generally E. RossiDEs, U.S. CusTOMS. SERVICE, U.S. 
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TARIFFS AND TRADE 295-321 (1977). 
78 For example, Customs must determine "the average aggregate apparent annual con-
sumption" of certain fish to determine the applicable tariff rate quota. 42 Fed. Reg. 9739 
(1977). 
79 For example, quotas on certain textile articles specify various quantity limits for nar-
rowly defined product categories, and Customs must determine in which category a particu-
lar import falls. 
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estimate when the quotas will be filled. Most quotas are adrillnis-
tered on a first come-first served basis; merchandise arriving at a 
port is released by Customs until the quota is filled. Merchandise 
arriving after the quota has been filled is generally held in a bonded 
warehouse until the quota is reopened (usually during the next 
year), or it may be exported. 
Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 193080 requires all imported 
merchandise to be marked in English to show its country of origin. 
Products not marked in conformity with both the statute and regu-
lations adopted by Customs are not permitted to eriter the country 
and are subject to an additional 10 percent duty if not properly 
marked at the time of liquidation. Issues arising under this statute 
usually concern the size, location, and wording of the required 
marking.81 Customs laws also prohibit the importation of mer-
chandise produced by "convict or/and forced labor,"82 and 
"obscene" matter or matter "advocating or urging treason or insur-
rection ."83 
b. Imports Prohibited Under Laws That Are Not Customs Laws 
Many statutes administered or enforced by Customs establish 
safety or other regulatory standards for products distributed in the 
United States, including the Lanham Trademark Act, the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, the Copyright Act, the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
80 9 u.s.c. § 1304 (1970). 
81 Customs regulations concerning both the wording of the required marking and excep-
tions to the marking requirements are contained in 19 C.F.R. §134.0-.55 ( 1977). See generally 
R. STURM, A MANUAL OF CusTOMS LAw 421 (1974); Note, Tariff Law-No Option to Import 
Without Marking, 12 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 596 (1973). 
82 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1970). Only one order prohibiting imports under this section is in 
effect. 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(h) (1977). Preliminary determinations are made by the Commis-
sioner of Customs after such investigation "as appears to be warranted," taking into account 
representations offered by any interested parties, id. §l2.42(d), but without formal adminis-
trative hearings. The final decision to exclude merchandise is made by the Commissioner of 
Customs with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, and can be protested. See text 
accompanying notes 58-65 supra. If the protest is denied, appeal to the Customs Court is 
possible. See text accompanying note .135 infra. See generally Armstrong, American Import 
Controls and Morality in International Trade: An Analysis of Section307 of the Tariff Act of I 930, 8 
N.Y.U. J. OF lNT'L L. & PoL. 19 (1975). 
83 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970). Imported matter violating this prohibition is subject to seizure 
under procedures prescribed by the Supreme Court. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (forfeiture action must be initiated within 14 days of seizure and 
completed within 60 days). See generally Comment, Government Seizures of Imported Obscene 
Maller: Section 305 of the. Tariff Aci of I930 and Recent Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions, 13 
COLUM. j. TRANSNAT'L L. 114 (1974). 
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Act of 1966.84 Some such statutes absolutely forbid the importation 
of specified merchandise.85 Customs' primary task under these 
statutes is to identify and interdict attempted entry of forbidden 
products, which may give rise to questions concerning whether a 
particular import falls within the prohibited class.86 
Statutes that set standards for, but do not. absolutely prohibit, 
imported merchandise often require that other agencies determine 
whether imports comply with the statute or applicable regula-
tions.87 Customs merely enforces such decisions by denying entry to 
noncomplying products. In such instances Customs action involves 
little or no discretionary decision-making. Customs acts in accor-
dance with the instructions it receives; if an importer is aggrieved 
by the exclusion of merchandise under one of these statutes, his 
complaint is usually with the agency interpreting and applying the 
standard, not with Customs itself. Nonetheless,• Customs does have 
an important administrative role in identifying products that are 
subject to various regulatory standards and coordinating examina-
tion and testing procedures with the relevant federal agency. In 
other instances, Customs seeks advice from other agencies when 
making decisions. For example, in determining whether imported 
material is either obscene or advocates or urges treason or insur-
rection within the meaning of the relevant statutes, Customs per-
sonnel generally rely upon the advice of U.S. attorneys. 
Under still other regulatory statutes Customs action is predicated 
to a greater degree on its own factual determinations or its in-
terpretation and application of statutory standards. If a trademark 
registered under the Lanham Trademark Act is also registered 
with Customs, Customs may deny entry to imported merchandise 
84 A complete list of all the statutes enforced by Customs, with relevant citations, is 
contained in OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CouNSEL, U.S. CusToMs SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T oF THE 
TREASURY, LAWS AND REGULATIONS ENFORCED OR ADMINISTERED BY THE UNITED STATES 
CusTOMS SERVICE (Apr. 1975). 
85 E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970) (munitions); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2077,2122,2131 (1970)(nuclear 
material); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1244 (1970) (switchblade knives). 
86 See e.g., Precise Imports Corp. v. Kelly, 218 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd, 378 
F.2d 1014 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967)(whether imported knives fell within 
prohibition on switchblade knives). 
87 E.g., 7 U .S.C. § 1360(c) (Supp. V 1975) (decisions concerning pesticides imported 
under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act to be made by Environmental 
Protection Agency), 21 U.S.C. § 381 (1970) (the Food and Drug Administration certifies 
foreign establishments as approved sources for pharmaceuticals under the Food and Drug 
Act and approves importations). 
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·which "bears"88 or "copies or simulates"89 that trademark. Simi-
larly, under the Copyright Act Customs may seize imports which in 
its determination bear a false copyright notice or infringe a work 
copyrighted in the United States. 90 
2. PToceduTes joT Prohibiting Imports 
The determination that merchandise should be excluded from 
the country is generally made while the goods are held by Customs 
for inspection. If so, the exclusion process may take one of two 
courses. Customs may simply refuse to release the merchandise 
until it is brought into compliance with the applicable regulation, 
or, if it cannot be brought into compliance, order it to be exported. 
Alternatively, if authorized by statute, Customs may seize the mer-
chandise (even if the merchandise is still in Customs custody) and 
proceed by means of administrative forfeiture proceedings, which 
in turn may lead Customs to initiate an in rem forfeiture action in 
a district court. 
a. Refusal to Release Goods 
Customs enforces most regulatory statutes applicable to imports 
by refusing to release merchandise determined to be ineligible for 
entry. For example, if Customs determines that textiles are subject 
to a quota that is already filled, that televisions are not properly 
marked to show the country of origin, or that a drug is imported 
r .·r '! r • 1 ,. 1 .,..--., . 1 r 
rrorn a noncerunea rorergn estaonsnment, Gusroms merery reruses 
to release the goods. Such determinations are made by the person-
nel at each port as part of the entry and examination process, and 
no hearing, evidentiary record, or reasoned opinion is provided. 91 
An importer who seeks to have such a determination reversed 
might first initiate informal discussions with the import specialist or 
inspector, his superior at the port, or personnel in the Office of 
"' 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1970). 
"" 15 U .S.C. § 1124 (1970). The Lanham Trademark Act, as amended, is codified at ! 5 
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123, 1127 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
9
° Congress revised the Copyright Act in 1976, Pub. L No. 91-553,90 Stat. 2541 (to be 
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810). As part of tl1e revision, Congress gave Cmtoms authority 
(to be codified at 17 U .S.C. § 603) to adopt regulations requiring a court order before it can 
take action against imports. 
91 An importer may decide not to challenge the determination. The im-porter of textiles 
may export the merchandise or store it in a bonded warehouse until the next quota period. 
The importer of televisions may export them or mark them in accordance with Custom's 
demands. The importer of drugs may attempt to have the foreign establishment certified or 
may export or destroy the drugs under Customs supervision. 
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Regulations and Rulings. In addition, if the decision not to release 
the merchandise is made under a customs law, the importer has 90 
days in which to file a protest. 92 Because such a protest involves the 
exclusion of merchandise, Customs must respond to it within 30 
days; if no response is given, or if the protest is denied, the 
importer can file a summons in the Customs Court seeking review 
of the issues raised in the protest. 93 Customs procedures for han-
dling such a protest are similar in their informality to procedures 
used for protests against liquidation decisions. 94 
If the exclusion of merchandise is pursuant to a law other than a 
customs law, the protest procedures are not available. An importer 
may utilize internal advice procedures to have the exclusion con-
sidered by the Office of Regulations and Rulings, 95 but there are 
no assurances that such procedures will provide prompt review .96 
Importers faced with continued refusal by Customs to release mer-
chandise may be granted review of that decision in a district 
court.97 
b. Seizure and ForfeituTe 
Some. of the statutes and regulations enforced by Customs re-
quire or authorize the. seizure and forfeiture of prohibited mer-
chandise.98 Under such statutes, seizure is used even if the mer-
chandise has not been released by Customs. Seizure procedures can 
92 19 u.s.c. § 1514 (1970) .. 
93 19 C.F.R. § 174.21 (1977). 
94 See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra. 
95 The procedures for obtaining internal advice are set forth in 19 C.F.R. §.177.11 (1977). 
Customs recently published a ruling given under the internal advice procedure at the 
request of a person whose merchandise had been refused entry as unlawful switchblade 
knives. See II CusT. BuLL. 7 (1977). 
96 Exclusion often results from a factual or legal determination made by an agency other 
than Customs, in which event challenge through the administrative process may depend on 
procedures established by the other agency. Interestingly, the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission provides an importer with a hearing on the record before an impartial hearing 
examiner before instructing Customs to prohibit goods from entering the country. See 15 
U.S.C. § 2066 (Supp. V 1975). This formal procedure for resolving disputed issues contrasts 
sharply with the more informal procedures used by Customs. 
91 See cases cited in notes 183-86 infra. 
98 Such statutes are of two types: those that authorize seizure because the merchandise is 
not allowed in the country, and those that authorize seizure because the person importing the 
merchandise has violated the law. The procedures described here are applicable to seizures 
under both types of statutes. Merchandise smuggled into the country is also subject to 
seizure and forfeiture. 
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be illustrated by Customs enforcement of the Lanham Trademark 
Act.gg 
Before seizure, while the goods are held by Customs, the import-
er is given notice of the alleged violation and an opportunity 
either to remedy the violation or to persuade Customs that no 
violation has occurred. With respect to alleged trademark infringe-
ment, the importer receives notice that the goods will be detained 
(i.e., denied entry) for 30 days, during which time the importer 
may demonstrate that the imports are not infringing any trade-
mark, obtain the trademark owner's consent to the importation, or 
remove the allegedly offending mark.100 If the importer does not 
obtain release of the merchandise by one of these methods within 
30 days, the importer is notified of his forfeiture liability, the 
merchandise is seized, and forfeiture proceedings are instituted.101 
However, the importer is given an opportunity to peti-
tion Customs for relief from forfeiture under mitigation provi-
sions.102 
The mitigation procedure (formally kno~vn as a "petition for 
relief from forfeiture") is initiated when the importer petitions 
Customs to reverse or otherwise modify its decision. 103 In the case 
of alleged trademark infringement, the application is reviewed by 
personnel in the Office of Regulations and Rulings, who hold 
informal discussions with interested parties-including the U.S. 
trademark owner-before making a determination. In unusual or 
significant cases, the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of 
the Treasury may become involved in the administrative ruling. 
If the importer does not file a mitigation petition, or if the issue 
is not resolved through the mitigation procedures, the Service 
moves to forfeit the goods.104 Customs may proceed by summary 
"" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072,1091-1096, 1lll-1121, 1123, ll27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).lt 
is unlawful to irnport Inerchandise which "bears" or "simulates or copies'' a tradeinark 
registered under the Act on the Principal Register and with Customs. 
100 19 C.F.R. § 133.22 (1977). The initial decision to detain merchandise is made by the 
import specialist, who may seek advice from his immediate superiors or from the Office of 
Regulations and Rulings in Washington, D.C. In many instances Customs is notified of the 
suspected infringement by the U.S. owner of the trademark, and inspectors are made aware 
of the possibility of importations of allegedly infringing merchandise. 
101 19 C.F.R. § 133.22(c) (1977). 
1112 The mitigation procedures are contained in 19 C.F.R. § 171.11-.13 (1977). 
103 In cases of alleged trademark infringement there is slight opportunity for compro-
mise, since the merchandise is not allowed in the country if Customs finds it to be infringing. 
The mitigation procedures are most often used when Customs is seeking monetary penalties. 
10
"' Some statutes authorize Customs to proceed against seized property in libel actions, in 
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forfeiture when the merchandise is either of a type whose entry is 
prohibited (as it would be if it allegedly infringed a U.S. trade-
mark), or valued at less than $2,500.105 It does so by giving the 
importer notice of summary forfeiture. Only if the importer files a 
claim for the goods is the case referred to a U.S. attorney for 
condemnation proceedings in a district court, after vyhich the 
goods a:re either released to the importer (if the importer prevails) 
or destroyed (if Customs prevails). 
If merchandise is valued at over $2,500 and is not of a type 
whose entry is prohibited, the only way Customs can secure forfei-
ture of the merchandise following the mitigation procedures is to 
refer the matter to a u.s. attorney for the institution of condem-
nation proce~dings in a district court. 1 06 In such condemnation 
proceedings, rules concerning the burden of proof facilitate the 
government's proof of a violation of law: once the government 
shows probable cause for instituting the forfeiture proceedigg, the 
person claiming the property has the burden of proving tfiat the 
alleged violation of law giving rise to the seizure did not occur. 1 07 
c. Recovery rf Merchandise After Release 
If Customs determines that merchandise should not be allowed 
in the country, but the merchandise has already been released to 
the importer, Customs has two options. If authorized by statute, it 
may seize the merchandise, in which event the mitigation and 
forfeiture procedures outlined above are followed. Such proce-
dures are employed, for example, when Customs seizes merchan-
dise alleged to be obscene. 
If the merchandise is not subject to seizure, Customs may de-
mand that the goods be delivered to it. The bond filed by the 
importer guarantees redelivery of merchandise not already sold or 
disposed of. If the goods are not redelivered upon demand, the 
importer has breached the bond and Customs may recover from 
the importer the liquidated damages specified in the bond.108 Cus-
which event Customs refers the case to a U.S. attorney for court proceedings without 
following the summary administrative procedures described in the text. 19 C.F.R. § 162.42 
(I 977). 
105 /d. § 162.46-.47. 
106 /d. § 162.49. Merchandise may be seized even if it is not of a type which is prohibited 
from entering the country, under statutes providing for seizure and forfeiture as a sanction 
for failure to report or for false or fraudulent practices. 
107 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1970). 
108 The procedures described here are also used by Customs to recover liquidated penal-
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toms proceeds by giving the importer notice of its claim for liqui-
dated damages and a demand for payment, following which the 
importer has the opportunity to file a petition for relief, setting 
forth facts that justify a cancellation of the claim. 1 09 Such a petition 
is subject to informal administrative review. The importer may 
discuss the issues with Customs personnel, but there is no 
provision for presentation of evidence or cross-examination at a 
hearing, or for a decision on the record. Most often, the parties 
reach a compromise and the importer pays a mitigated damage 
amount. If no compromise is reached (or if the importer does not 
file a petition for relief), the case can be referred to a U.S. attorney 
for the institution of an action in a federal district court to recover 
the liquidated damages stipulated in the bond. 110 
Penalty Provisions 
Because the Customs Service relies primarily on information 
reported by importers, it must be assured that such information is 
accurate and complete. To further that end, Congress has granted 
Customs broad authoritv to imoose nenalties on those who either 
. ; - ---A - r -
fail to report or report in a false or fraudulent manner. 
The most notable such authority is contained in 19 U .S.C. § 592 
(hereinafter referred to as section 592), which prohibits fraudtuent 
or false statements or practices with respect to imports, and, as a 
penalty, authorizes Customs to seek forfeiture of either the im-
ported goods or the value of the imported goods. Although there 
are 40 other statutes which authorize Customs to assess fines or 
penalties,111 section 592 is the most often invoked and the most 
controversial of the penalty provisions. 112 
ties for noncompliance with the other conditions of a bond-for example, failure to com-
plete entry procedures within stipulated time periods or deliver reguired documentation. 
lOD 19 C.F.R. § 172.1 (1977). 
110 1d. § ! 72.2. 
111 A list of a!! such statutes is contained in P;·ocedural Reform Hearings, sujJra note 13, at 
315 (statement of author) and 541 (statement of Customs Service). See, e.g., 19 U .S.C. § 1460 
(1970) (failure to report arrival of a vessel in the United States from a contiguous country); 
19 U.S.C. § 1584 (1970) (failure to provide accurate manifests); 19 U .S.C. § 1497 (1970) 
(failure to properly declare articles ~pan entry). 
112 Enforcement of Section 592 is an area of Customs activity that has received wide 
publicity and attention. See Dickey, CllStoms: Fines, Forfeitures, Penalties and the Mitigation 
Procedures--Sections 592 and 618 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 30 Bus. LAw. 299 (1975)[ hereinaf-
ter cited as Dickey I]; Dickey, SuroivaL1 from More Primitive Times: Customs Forfeitures in the 
iVlodern Commercial Setting Und<>r Sections 592 and 618 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 7 LAw 8c PoL'Y 
INT'L Bus. 691 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dickey II]; Herzstein. The Need to Reform Section 
1130 [Vol. 9:1101 
JUDiCIAL REVIEW 
Substantively, section 592 prohibits a broad range of conduct, 
making it unlawful to attempt to bring merchandise into the 
United States by means of any "fraudulent or false" statement or 
practice "without reasonable cause to believe the truth" of the 
statement, whether or not the United States is deprived of duties'" 
The statute also makes it unlawful to aid or procure such fals'e 
statement or practice, and prohibits any willful act or omission by 
which the United States may be deprived of duties. 113 Many section 
592 cases result from false statements on entry documents, such as 
understatements of the quantity of goods imported, misstatements 
of the invoice price of goods, or the omission of information 
required by Customs to determine the proper appraised value of 
merchandise-for example, data concerning buying commissions 
or "assists.'' 114 If an importer misstates the country of origin of 
merchandise to avoid restrictions on trading with certain countries 
or ships merchandise through a third country to avoid a quota, he 
is subject to penalties under section 592 .n5 Section 592 violations 
are not limited, however, to statements or practices known to be 
false by the person involved-even a negligent falsehood is prohib-
ited by section 592 if it occurs without a "reasonable cause to 
believe the truth" of the statement.116 
The penalty for violation of section 592 is fixed by statute and is 
592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 10 INT'L LAw. 285 (1976). See also Modernization Act Hearings, 
supra note 9; Procedural Reform Hearings, supra note 14. 
113 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1970). Two criminal statutes also prohibit false import practices. 
Using language similar to that in section 592, 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1970) provides for a fine of 
not more than $5,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than 2 years for false or fraudulent 
statements or practices. Suspected ·violations of this provision are referred to U.S. attorneys 
by the Customs Special Agent investigating the alleged violations, after review and consulta-
tion with the Regional Counsel of Customs. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE 
TREASURY, CIRCULAR No. ENF-3-CC Uune 10, 1975). Under a second criminal statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 545 (1970), it is unlawful to knowingly and wilfully smuggle or clandestinely 
introduce merchandise into the United States or to make out any false or fraudulent 
document with intenno defraud the United States. Violations are punishable by a fine of not 
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. See also id. § 543. 
'" Assists include blueprints, molds, and dies given by the importer to the foreign 
manufacturer in connection with the manufacture of merchandise for the importer. The 
value of such assists must be considered in determining dutiable value and is. required to be 
stated on the entry documents. Often, there is a legitimate dispute concerning which types of 
services constitute dutiable assists. 
'" U.S. Dep't of the Treasury News Release, Customs Frauds: Hunting Moths in a Dust Storm 
(Oct. 26, 1975). See also Dickey I, supra note 112, at 303-05. 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 434 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. I 970) which interpreted and 
modified an earlier case holding that intent to defraud was a required element of a section 
592 violation. See also Kohner v. Wechsler, 477 F.2d 666, 673 n.I2 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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exttemely high. Regardless of the culpability of the violator or the 
revenue loss or other injury to the United States, the penalty is 
fixed as forfeiture of the imported goods or their value. 117 As a 
result, Customs often must assess extreme penalties (which may 
later be mitigated) for relatively insignificant violations.U 8 Al-
though Customs is authorized by section 592 to seize merchandise 
and seek its forfeiture as a sanction, it rarely does this. 119 Customs 
never seizes merchandise if, as is often the case, it is in the hands 
of an innocent purchaser120 when the violation is discovered. Cus-
toms regulations were recently amended to provide that merchan-
dise otherwise lawfully in the country may be seized under section 
592 only if a district director determines that the violator appears 
to be insolvent, that his assets are beyond the jurisdiction of the 
United States, or that seizure is .otherwise necessary to protect the 
revenue. 121 In other instances, monetary penalties are assessed. 
Customs initiates the penalty process by sending the person 
involved-the respondent-a "pre-penalty notice" informing him 
of Customs' intention to assess penalties under section 592 if he 
fails to demonstrate within 30 days that such penalties would be 
improper. 122 After receiving the notice, the respondent, using in-
formal procedures, may persuade the district director that a viola-
tion has not occurred or that the assessment of the penalty would be inappropriate for some other reason. 123 If the district director 
117 The value of the goods imposed as a penalty is "domestic valuen (roughly the price at 
which the same merchandise would be purchased in the United States) rather than the value 
used to assess import duties. 19 C.F.R. § 162.43(a) (1977). 
118 The American Importers Association cites an example in which Customs allegedly lost 
about 1)200 in revenue because of negligent conduct but assessed a penalty of 1~135,000. 
American Importers Association, Why Customs Penalty Statute (Sec. 592) JHust Be Changed! 
(unpublished position paper on file with the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Washington, D.C.). The Wall Street Journal reports penalty assessments of 1~ 110 million 
against Electronic Memories and Magnetic Corp., 1H3 million against Control Data Corp., 
1H2.5 million against Standard-Kollsman Industries, Inc., and $40 million against Mattei, 
Inc. Wall St. J., Mar. ll, 1975, at 42, col. I. 
119 If merchandise seized under se.ction 592 is worth less than $50,000, it may be released 
to the owner if the owner deposits with Customs the full value of the merchandise in cash or 
a letter of credit. !d. § 162.44(a). 
128 /d. § 162.41(a). 
121 42 Fed. Reg. 25,323 (1977) as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 27,599 (1977). 
122 If the penalty assessment is less than $25,000, no pre-penalty notice is given; the 
importer is first notified of the alleged violation when he receives a penalty assessment 
notice. 19 C.F.R. §§ 102.31, 171.1(b) (1977). 
123 Decisions to assess penalties for section 592 violations are made by district directors, 
who determine whether a violation has occurred and whether the violation is of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant penalty proceedings. Often, violations perceived to be non-negligent 
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remains unconvinced, he issues a claim of penalty, a form similar to 
the pre-penalty notice, assessing the full penalty and demanding 
payment. 
After receiving a claim of penalty, the respondent may invoke 
the mitigation procedures provided under section 618 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, which gives the Secretary of the Treasury (and Cus-
toms as his delegate) the authority to mitigate forfeitures and 
penalties upon such terms and conditions as he considers just and 
reasonable.124 To invoke these procedures, the respondent files a 
petition demonstrating that a violation has not occurred or that the 
penalty should be reduced. If the penalty assessment exceeds 
$25,000, the Office of Regulations and Rulings decides whether 
and how much to mitigate the penalty, basing its decision on 
information submitted by the respondent and on a written report 
from the district director.125 Such decisions are discretionary and 
non reviewable .126 
During this process, the respondent generally is given oppor-
tunities to discuss the facts of the case with the district director or 
other decision-maker and to present written information and ar-
gument. No formal record is kept, however, and the importer has 
no formal opportunity to challenge the information relied 
on against him. If the information is contained in an investigative 
report compiled by a Customs agent, the importer normally sees 
only a summary of the information. No statement of the facts or 
legal principles underlying the decision is made.127 
Because the assessed ·penalty is almost always disproportionate to 
. the culpability of the respondent or the loss of revenue resulting 
from the violation, Customs virtually always offers to mitigate the 
or "technical" are settled without a penalty assessment by permitting the importer to correct 
the entry documents and pay the revenue deficiency. The district director's decision to assess 
a penalty is based in part upon information assembled by a Customs investigating agent. 
124 19 u.s.c. § 1618 (1970). 
125 If the penalty assessment is less than $25,000, decisions concerning mitigation ·are 
made by the director of the district in which the goods were entered. 19 C.F.R. § 171.21 
(1977). 
126 See, e.g., United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop Automobile, 337 F.2d 730 (6th 
Cir. 1964) (federal courts have no jurisdiction to grant remission or mitigation for forfeiture 
of car used in illegal transportation of narcotics). Contra, United States v. One 1974 Mercury 
Cougar Automobile, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C. D. Cal. 1975). 
127 Mitigation decisions are formalized by notifying the respondent of the amou.nt to 
which Customs is willing to mitigate the penalty. The form letter used for this purpose 
contains no explanation of the basis of the determination. If dissatisfied with this mitigation 
offer, respondent may file a supplemental petition for mitigation. 19 C.F.R. § 171.33 (1977). 
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penalty.128 But such offers to mitigate present the respondent with 
a hard choice. V'l!hile the respondent may acquiesce in Customs' 
decision on the violation and pay the mitigated penalty in settle-
ment of the claim, if he does, he forfeits his right to judicial review. 
On the other hand, in order to obtain judicial review of the Ser-
vice's determination the respondent must forego the benefit of 
mitigation and risk incurring the entire penalty.129 This dilemma, 
more often th~m not, pressures the respondent into accepting the 
mitigation offer, and as a consequence few section 592 penalty 
assessments are effectively subject to judicial review.130 This 
amounts to what one writer has termed "administrative black-
maiJ."131 
By assessing a penalty and then offering to compromise 
128 1n 1974, in an effort to increase public understanding of section 592 procedures, the 
Department of the Treasury published internal guidelines governing such mitigation deci-
sions by Customs. Guidelines for the Remission or Mitigation of Fmfeitures and Claims for Forfeiture 
Value, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,06! (1974). In general, the guidelines contemplate that penalties will 
be mitigated to an amount which reflects the revenue loss resulting from the violation and 
the culpability of the defendant, taking into account such factors as any contributory error 
by Customs personnel, respondent's cooperation with Customs investigators, and remedial 
action taken by the respondent. Customs may reduce penalty assessments to an amount 
equivalent to the revenue loss resulting from the violation if voluntary disclosure of a 
violation is made before an investigation has been initiated. 19 C.F.R § 171.1 (1977). 
"
9 See 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1970). However, in an unreported decision, Andean Credit, S.A. 
v. United States, No. 73-1294-CIV-WM (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1973), the court refused to 
order forfeiture of a yacht valued at over 1) 1 million, which it stated would be "so severe a 
penalty as to be shocking to the conscience of this Court." Instead, the court ordered 
payment of unpaid duties, which amounted to 1~60,000. 
130 The pressure to compromise claims is demonstrated by the following information 
compiled by William Dickey, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs, comparing the original penalty assessments in 
randomly selected section 592 cases \\~th the amount to which the assessment was mitigated: 
(in dollars) 
Penaliy i'vlitigated Amount Penalty Mitigated Amount 
179,398 34,785 193,400 12,431 
1,770,855 5,413 150,876 3,944 
345,000 3,244 2,202,413 23,673 
219,741 13,275 5,510,450 88,000 
2,210,706 30,888 4,714,811 250 
See Dickey 11, supra note 112, at 703-05. 
131 Nelson, Administrative Blackmail: The Remission of Penalties,<! WEST. PoL. Q. 610, 620 
(1951). The author referred to use of authority to mitigate penalties by administrative 
agencies in general. See also Murphy, Money Penalties-An Administrative Sword of Damocles,2 
SANTA CLARA LAw. ll3 (1962). Statutes imposing monetary penalties and authorizing ad-
ministrative agencies to remit or mitigate the penalty are common. See Gellhorn, Administra-
tive Prescription and Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U .L.Q. 265 (1970). 
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or mitigate, [an agency] may induce the defendant to 
settle his alleged liability in order to avoid the risk of 
incurring the full penalty in a court proceeding. As a 
result the defendant is often penalized without even an 
administrative hearing. The safeguard of court review to 
protect the rights of defendants is bargained away. Court 
review, however, is intended to serve another purpose. It 
is the means of confining the actions of errant adminis-
trators, of holding them true to the policies laid down by 
the legislature. The only means of involving this supervi- · 
sian is litigation. If the litigants are bought off, the ad-
ministrators are free to shape policy as they please .132 
If a party against whom penalties have been assessed refuses to 
pay the original or a mitigated penalty, the case is referred to a 
U.S. attorney for the institution of forfeiture proceedings in a 
district court. The respondent may be afforded another opportu-
nity to settle the case for less than the penalty amount (even for less 
than the mitigation amount offered by Customs) .133 Respondents 
who seek judicial review of penalty assessments face an additional 
burden in forfeiture proceedings. In such proceedings, the gov-
ernment need only show probable cause for the institution of the 
suit; if it does, the burden is on the respondent to prove that the 
penalty statute was not violated. 134 · 
juDICIAL REviEw oF CusToMs AcTION 
Overview 
The Customs Court and U.S. district courts share responsibility 
for reviewing action taken by the Customs Service.135 District 
132 Nelson, supra note 120, at 611-12 (footnote deleted). 
133 Some attorneys advise their clients not to accept mitigation offers made by Customs 
because they feel the U.S. attorneys generally offer better settlement terms. There are no 
procedures governing such settlements. 
134 See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1970); United States v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 129, 134 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also United States v. Nephrite Jade, 325 F. Supp. 986, 989 (W.D. Mo. 
1970). 
135 In addition, a co1.1rt of appeals reviews decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury to 
revol<e or suspend a broker's license. 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (1970). This article does not 
consider the adequacy or propriety of judicial review in such instances. No provision governs 
judicial review of decisions to deny a license, which are made by the Commissioner uf 
Customs and reviewed ,by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
1977] 1135 
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
courts hear cases in which the Service seeks to coHect liquidated 
damages for violation of the terms of a bond, or seeks forfeiture of 
merchandise under a· provision authorizing seizure, or seeks to 
collect a penalty. The Customs Court has no jurisdiction oversuch 
cases. 
In other cases, division of jurisdiction between the Customs 
Court and district courts is governed by the following considera-
tions. The subject matter jurisdiction of the Customs Courtl 36 is 
delineated by statute-the court has exclusive jurisdiction to re-
view those Customs actions that are subject to a protest, and to hear 
appeals by U.S. manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers that are 
authorized under section 516 of the Tariff Act of. 1930. The 
Customs Court has no jurisdiction to revievv Custo-ms actions not 
subject to a protest or petition and may not take jurisdiction over 
those actions that are subject thereto until a protest (by an impor-
ter) or a petition (by a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler) 
has been filed and denied. "Final judgments or orders" of the 
Customs Court are reviewed by the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals. 137 
Cong:ress has not explicitly provided for review of Customs ac-
tions that are not subject to protest or petition. District courts often 
exercise their general and special jurisdictional powers to review 
such actions. 
Thus, when Customs action does not involve a penalty, forfei-
ture, or liquidated damages-matters over which only the district 
courts have jurisdiction-the jurisdiction of the Customs Court 
controls the division of responsibility between that court and dis-
trict courts. Because jurisdiction in the Customs Court is available 
only to those persons authorized to file a protest or petition, and is 
not available until a protest or petition is denied by Customs, the 
prereqtiisites to st!it in th.e Ct1sto1ns CoLrrt also li1nit standing to 
challenge certain Customs actions as well as the timing of judicial 
review. 
136 On the Customs Court generally seeR. STURM, A MANUAL OF CusTOMS LAW 12 (1974); 
Johnson, The United States Customs Court-Its History, jurisdiction, and Procedure, 7 OKLA. L. 
REV. 393 (1954); Rao,A Primer on Customs Court Practice,40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 581 (1974). 
137 28 U .S.C. § 1541 (a) (1970). 
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Customs Court jurisdiction 
1. Suits by importers 
For importers, brokers, and others involved in the importing 
process, access to the Customs Court is controlled by the protest 
procedure at Customs. The Customs Court has jurisdiction over 
suits by importers only if the importer has filed a protest, the 
protest has been denied by Customs, and the importer has paid all 
liquidated duties, charges, or exactions.138 
The subjects over which the Customs Court has jurisdiction in a 
suit by an importer include all matters subject to a protest under 
the protest provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1514, and none others. The 
Customs Court's jurisdictional statute provides: 
§ 1582 Jurisdiction of the Customs Court 
(a) The Customs C~urt shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of civil actions instituted by any person whose protest 
pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has been 
denied, in whole or in part, by the appropriate customs 
officers, where the administrative decision, including the 
legality of all orders and findings entering into the same, 
involves: (1) the appraised value of merchandise; (2) the 
classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable; 
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within 
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury; ( 4) the 
exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery under 
any provisions of the customs laws; (5) the liquidation or 
reliquidation of an entry, or a modification thereof; (6) the 
refusal to pay a claim for drawback; or (7) the refusal to 
reliquidate an entry under section 520(c) of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended.139 
With respect to these areas, the jurisdiction of the Customs Court is 
exdusive.140 Thus, a suit brought in a district court to review any of 
138 Protests are filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1970), which specifies the seven 
types of Customs action that are subject to a protest. Actions subject to a protest under this 
section are identical to those over which the Customs Court has jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. 
§ 1582 (1970). 
139 28 U .S.C. § 1582(a) ( i 970). 
140 Id. The exclusivity of Customs Court jurisdiction is reconfirmed by 28. U .S.C. § 1340 
(1970), which grants district courts original jurisdiction over "any civil action arising under 
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the types of administrative actions listed in the seven subparagrahs 
of section l582(a) is subject to dismissal for lack of su.bject matter 
jurisdiction.141 
Actions by the Customs Service not subjett to protest under 
section 1514 (and thus not within the seven subparagraphs of the 
court's jurisdictional statute) are not subject to review in the Cus-
toms Court. For example, although the Customs Court has juris-
diction to review actions excluding merchandise under a customs 
bw,H2 actions excluding merchandise under a law that is not a 
customs law are not subject to a protest or to review under section 
1582, and hence are not reviewable by the Customs Court.143 
Similarly, navigation fees and certain inspection fees collected by 
the Customs Service are not "charges or exactions ... '".rithin the 
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury" and are subject to 
neither a protest nor an appeal in the Customs Court. 144 
any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue, or revenue from imports on tonnage, 
except matters within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court" (emphasis supplied). 
141 Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the Implementation of 
Textile Agreements, No. 76-1064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1977), petition Jot 12hcan'rzg d2nic:d (D.C. 
Cir. Sept. 2, 1977); SC:M Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(directing district court to retain jurisdiction until Customs Court ruled on its own jurisdic-
tion); Fritz v. United States, 535 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1976); J.C. Penney Co. v. United States 
Treasury Dep't, 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. !97!), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Kocher v. 
Fowler, 397 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968); N. Am. Cement 
Corp. v. Anderson, 284 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1960); E. States Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 280 
F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Morgantown Glassware Guild v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 6'70 (D.C. 
Cir. 1956), cerl. denied, 352 U.S. 896 (1956); Boston Wool Trade Ass'n v. Snyder, 161 F.2d 
648 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938); Riccomini v. United 
States, 69 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1934); Kreutz v. Durning, 69 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1934); Akins v. 
Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Maine 1974); Altieri v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 458 
(D.P.R. 1969); Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1956); Nat'! Sanitary Rag Co. 
v. Hamilton, 4 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal. !933). 
HZ See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States, lnc. v. Comm. for the Implementa-
tion of Textile Agreements, No. 76-l 064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, ! 977), petition for rehearing 
denied (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1977) (exclusion under voluntary quota is within exclusive jurisdic-
tion of Customs Court); Benrus Watch Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 191 (Cust. Ct. 
1964) (exclusion for failure to mark watch movements). 
113 See, e.g., V.G. Nahrgang v. United States, T.D. 47,13,1, 65 TREAS. DEc. 1095 (1934) 
(refusal of Customs to release imports found adulterated by Food and Drug Administration 
not subject to Customs Court review). But see Karl Schroff & Assocs. v. United States, 47 
Cust. Ct. 339 (1961) (government agrees to release merchandise excluded under copyright 
statute after protest and Customs Court suit; jurisdiction of court not questioned). 
H< See Puget Sound Freight Lines v. United States, 36 C.C.P.A. 70 (1949) (navigation fees 
and charges under 19 U .S.C. § 58 (1970) are not "exactions within the jurisdiction of the 
Treasury," and thus are not subject to Customs Court review); Louis Rube v. United States, 
T.D. 26,936, 10 TREAS. DEC. 737 (1905), Aff'd, T.D. 27,773, 12 TREAS. DEC. 612 (1906) 
(inspection fee imposed by Department of Agriculture not reviewable in Customs Court). 
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When Customs assesses liquidated damages for breach of the 
conditions of an import bond, the Customs Court will normally 
review the assessment since the liquidated damages are construed 
to be a "charge or exaction . . . within the jurisdiction of the 
Secretary of the Treasury" and therefore subject to both protest 
under section 1514 and review in the Customs Court under section 
1582.145 The Customs Court has jurisdiction to review whether 
liquidated damages were lawfully assessed for failure to redeliver 
merchandise to Customs upon demand, 146 failure to submit entry 
documents within the time specified in a bond for immediate 
release privileges,147 and failure to submit proper proof of 
exportation for merchandise entered temporarily.14 8 However, the 
Customs Court considers only whether the conditions of the bond 
were violated~ It may not review the amount of the liquidated 
damages set in the bond and assessed by Customs since that is a 
"legislative matter" that is "within the control of the administrative 
officers." 149 
The protest requirement limits the jurisdiction of the Customs 
Court in other ways. The following Customs actions are not subject 
to protest or tq review in the Customs Court: refusal to grant, and 
suspension of, immediate delivery privileges; 150 refusal to grant, or 
revocation of, a license to perform _the duties of a public gauger or 
bonded warehouseman;151 denial of a customhouse broker's 
license; 152 and decisions concerning the amount of a bond required 
to be filed. 153 
Such actions are reviewable in a district court. See, e.g., Carriso, Inc. v. United States, 106 
F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1939). 
145 However, to be reviewable in the Customs Court the exaction "must relate in some 
manner to imported merchandise and affect the importer, consignee, or agent of such 
imported merchandise." Universal Carloading and Distributing Co., Abstract 35,743, 71 
TREAS. DEc. I 083 ( 1936) (Customs Court declines jurisdiction to review imposition of 
liquidated damages against bonded carrier for failure to deliver merchandise). 
146 Huber v. United States, 29 Cust. Ct. 92 (1952) rev'd on other grounds,41 C.C.P.A. 69 
(1953). But see Klein v. United States, T.D. 47,281, 66 TREAS. DEc. 297 (1934). 
147 J.M. Altieri v. United States, 46 Cust. Ct. 307 (1961). 
148 Arthur Cook v. United States, 6 Cust. Ct. 114 (1941); Guy Barkam Co. v. United 
States, 7 Cust. Ct. 155 (1941). 
149 United States v. Frank F. Smith & Co., 25 C.C.P.A. !63, 167-68 (1937). 
150 See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra. 
151 See notes 30 and 34 supra. 
152 See note 135 supra. 
153 American Askania Corp. v. United States, 10 Cust. Ct. 76 (1943). See text accompany-
ing note 40 supra. In addition, the ability of the Customs Court to correct erroneous Customs 
action has been limited because the Customs Court has held that the Customs actions 
involved are discretionary and therefore not subject to review. For example, Customs, as 
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2. Suits by U.S. Competitors 
The Customs Court also has exclusive jurisdiction -when a 
petition filed by a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler 
under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 193015 ~ is denied. 155 This 
permits judicial review of the same matters that are subject to a 
petition under section 516: decisions concerning appraisement, 
dassiJl.cation, or rates of duty, including antidumping and 
countervailing duties; a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury of 
no sales or likelihood of sales at less than fair value under the 
Antidumping Act of 1 921; 56 and a finding by the Secretary of the 
Treasury under the Countervailing Duty Act157 that no bounty or 
grant was bestowed on imports. District courts have no jurisdiction 
to review these matters.158 
However, the procedures leading to review in the Customs Court 
are not available unless the challenged decision relates to 
delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized to abate or refund duties on 
merchandise destroyed while in Customs' custody. See 19 U .S.C.§ 1563 (1970). The Customs 
Court has held that it has no authority either to grant such refund if Customs has declined 
to do so, or to review the merits of Customs' decisions. Deila Failde v. United States, 388 F. 
Supp. 564 (Cust. Ct. 1963); Michaelian & Kohlberg v. United States, 65 TREAS. DEc. 1372 
(1934). Other cases have acknowledged the court's power to determine wht:,ther Customs 
actions under this provision exceed its authority or fail to comply witl1 the terms of the 
statute, but without indicating that the power would be used to control Customs action 
effectively. D.M. Ferry & Co. v. United States, 85 F. 550,557 (6th Cir. 1898); H.Z. Bernstein 
Co. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (Cust. Ct. 1958). But see Art Craft Jewelry Co. 
v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 414, 418 (1970) (without considering right to review, court 
apparently held plaintiff's claim invalid as a matter of law). 
However, the scope of review of such discretionary functions was changed recently when 
the court. adopted Administrative Procedure Act standards for judicial review of discretio-
nary action. Suwanee Steamship Co. v. United States, C.D. 4708 (Cust. Ct. July 18, 1977). 
The appropriate scope of review of discretionary actions is not considered in this Article. 
154 See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra. Actions challenging denial of a petition are 
given precedence in the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 28 
u.s.c. §§ 2633, 2602 (1970). 
"" 28 U.S.C. § l582(b) (1970). 
15
" 19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975). The Act authorizes the imposition of a special 
dumping duty on imports found to have been sold at less than fair value if a U.S. industry is 
being or is likely to be injured by reason of the importation. The Act also authorizes the 
imposition of countervailing duties to offse't the amount of bounties or grants bestowed 
upon imported merchandise. 
157 Id. § 1303. Section 516 also permits a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler to 
seek review of Customs decisions not to impose special marking duties under 19 U .S.C. § 
!304 (1970). Diamond Match Co. v. United States, 44 Cust. Ct. 67 (1960). See note 81 supra 
and accompanying text. 
153 See Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morganthau, 80 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
297 U.S. 718 ( 1936). But see discussion of Timken v. Simo11, note 196 ir~fra and accompanying 
text. 
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merchandise that is the same class or kind as that dealt in by the 
U.S. firm bringing the challenge. Actions of the Customs Service 
that are not subject tci challenge under section 516 may ,not be 
challenged in the Customs Court. 159 
Character and Powers if the Customs Court 
The Customs Court has been designated by Congress as "a court 
established under Article III of the Constitution"160 and is com-
posed of nine judges appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. The judges hold office for life during 
good behavior. 161 Legislation provides that no more than five 
judges may be appointed from the same political party and that the 
chief judge is to be designated "from time to time" by the Presi-
dent.162 
The court has national jurisdiction, encompassing controversies 
arising in any state or territory of the United States. Although the 
court is located in New York City, it is empowered to, and does, 
hold trials or hearings at any port or place within its jurisdiction.163 
Moreover, the chief judge may order a judge of the court to 
preside at an evidentiary hearing in a foreign country, unless such 
hearings are prohibited by the laws of such country. 164 
The court has been given all the powers of a district court for 
preserving order, compelling the attendance of witnesses, and re-
quiring the production of evidence,165 and the rules of the Cus-
toms Court provide a full system of pre-trial discovery from parties 
and nonparties, including the production of documents, requests 
159 E.C. Miller Cedar Lumber Co. v. United States, 86 F.2d 429, 434 (C.C.P.A. 1936) 
(decisions concerning measure, weight, and quantities of imported merchandise, which 
determine duty assessments, not subject to challenge). 
160 28 U .S.C. § 251 (1970). This provision was enacted to overrule Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 
279 U.S. 438 (1929}, which held that the Court of Customs Appeals (the predecessor of the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) was a legislative court not established under Article 
Ill of the Constitution. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1965). 
161 28 U .S.C § 252 (Supp. V 1975). 
162 28 u.s.c § 251 (1970). 
163 Id. § 256; CusT. CT. R. 2.2(a). 
164 28 u.s.c. § 256 (1970). 
165 Jd. § 1581. See also id. § 2637 (witnesses; inspection of documents). The court's 
authority to impose sanctions for failure to respond to discovery requests is articulated in 
CusT. CT. R. 6.5(b)(2). See, e.g., Gehrig, Hoban & Co. v. United States, 76 Cust. Ct. 277 
(1976). The court may also punish persons for criminal contempt of court under 18 U .S.C.§ 
401 (1970). Holt v. United States, 41 C.C.P.A. "8 (1953); In re Spector, 42 Cust. Ct. 726 
(1959). 
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for admissions, interrogatories and depositions,166 as well as com-
plete motion practice.167 Cases are usually heard and decided by a 
single judge, but the chief judge may appoint three judges to hear 
and decide cases involving a constitutional question or an issue with 
"broad or significant" implications.168 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Customs 
Court itself have often said that the Customs Court lacks "equity" 
jurisdiction and "equity power." 169 What is meant by such state-
ments is far from clear; the decisions convey at least two different 
meanings. In one sense, the statement that the Customs Court has 
no equity power signifies that the Customs Court lacks jurisdiction 
to review administrative action before a protest has been filed and 
denied.170 As so understood, the Customs Court's lack of equity 
power invites consideration of whether-and under what 
circumstances-the Customs Court should be authorized to inter-
vene in the administrative process prior to filing and denial of a 
protest. That question is covered by the recommendations set forth 
later in this article. 
Other decisions referring to the lack of equity power in the 
Customs Court have done so in a different context, indicating that 
the Customs Court will adhere to procedural statutes or regulations 
even when a strict interpretation leads to unexpected or unjust 
results.171 These cases suggest that Customs should adopt a more 
flexible approach when substantial interests otherwise would suffer 
because of harmless, inadvertent procedural errors, 172 but they do 
166 CusT. CT. R. 6. 
167 !d. R. 4. See generally Rao, A Primer on Customs Court Practice, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 581 
(1974). 
168 28 u.s.c. § 255 (1970). 
169 See, e.g., Eurasia Import Co. v. United States, 31 C.C.P.A. 202, 211 (I 944) and cases 
cited in notes 170 and 172 infra. 
170 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 67 Cust. Ct. 328 
(1971), affd, 485 F.2d 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (Customs Court 
denied its own equity power by refusing to invoke All Writs Act to review administrative 
action not subject to protest but allegedly ripe for review). 
171 See, e.g., Bullocks, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cust. Ct. 12 (1941) (although error occurred 
because Customs officer failed to mark documents properly Customs not required to re-
liquidate entries pursuant to a prior judgment); Olaf V. Sundt v. United States, 4 Cust. Ct. 
114 ( 1940) (Customs Court has no "equity powers" to hear claim for remission of dutie~ 
· when petition for remission was filed just after the 60 day deadline). 
172 The other cases in which the "equity power" of the Court has been denied also reflect 
strict adherence to provisions of law, despite plaintiffs claim that the result is inequitable. 
Cummins-Collins Distilleries v. United States, 36 C.C.P.A. 88 (I 949) (rejecting plaintiffs 
claim that it is inequitable to require plaintiff to pay higher duty after goods have been sold 
at price calculated to include only low estimated duty); Carl Matusek Shipping Co. v. United 
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not suggest that the Customs Court's jurisdiction should be 
changed and would not be affected by the recommendations in this 
article. 
When the Customs Court does have jurisdiction following the 
denial of a protest or petition, it is unclear whether the court has 
the power to issue injunctions or writs of mandamus. 173 The court 
has never issued a writ in those circumstances; nor has it been 
asked to do so, but there is authority to the effect that it could do 
so. Under the All Writs Act174 "all courts of the United States" (and 
thus the Customs Court) 175 have the right to issue writs in aid of 
their respective jurisdictions. The Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals has issued writs under this Act in both patent and customs 
cases, 176 and it is likely that, were it faced with the issue, the 
Customs Court would hold that once it has jurisdiction it is au-
thorized to issue writs in appropriate cases under the All Writs Act. 
In any event, the recommendations of this article would confer 
explicit authority on the Customs Court to issue injunctions. 
It is also unclear whether the Customs Court may issue declara-
tory judgments. In an early case, Eurasia Import Co. v. United 
States, 331 F. Supp. 1386 (Cust. Ct. 1963) (plaintiffs failure to file proper form is sufficieilt 
reason to deny drawbacks); Gilbert W. Greene v. United States, 13 Cust. Ct. 237 (1944) (no 
"equity power" to consider importer's claim that he would have been exempt from duties 
had he not followed Customs' erroneous advice with respect to filing of forms). 
Other cases have required strict adherence to procedural rules without referring to the 
Court's lack of "equity power." American Mail Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 34 C.C.P.A. I 
(1946) (protest dismissed because grounds relied upon at trial were different from those 
contained in protest); Nikko Boeki, lnt'l, Inc. v. United States, 71 Cust. Ct. 16 (1973) 
(protests dismissed because filed three days prior to liquidation; protest to be valid must be 
filed after liquidation); Best Foods, Inc. v. United States, I 4 7 F. Supp. 749 (Cust. Ct. I 956) 
(same). 
173 The Matsushita case, supra note I 70, did not address that precise issue. There, the 
Customs Court held that it could not exercise power under the All Writs Act until after the 
jurisdictional prerequisite of a denied protest had been satisfied. See also Dexter v. United 
States, II CusT. BuLL. 50 (Cust. Ct. Feb. 9, I 977). 
174 28 U.S.C. § 165I(a) (1970). 
175 Id. § 451. Moise Products Co. v. United States, 37 Cust. Ct. 135 (1956). 
176 United States v. Boe, 543 F.2d 151 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals has jurisdiction under All Writs Act to order Chief judge of Customs Court not to 
take jurisdiction); Cook v. Dann, 522 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. I 975) (asserting court's power to 
issue writs, but refusing to exercise such power in absence of executive abuse of discretion); 
Import Motors, Ltd. v. Int'I Trade Comm'n, 530 F.2d 937 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (enjoining the 
International Trade Commission from precluding plaintiff from hearing in a section 337 
proceeding), vacated, 530 F.2d 940 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Wei! v. Dann, 503 F.2d 562 (C.C.P.A. 
I 974) (asserting court's power to issue writs, but refusing to exercise power where-it would 
not foster effective appellate review); Loshbaugh v. Allen, 404 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 
I 969) (acknowledging mandamus power, but refusing to suspend a proceeding before the 
Commissioner of Patents). 
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States, 177 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated in dicturn 
that the Customs Court could not issue declaratory judgments, but 
did not expressly consider the effect of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act. That statute provides that: 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, 
except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United 
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 
declare the right§ and other legal relations of any inter-
ested party seeking such declaration (emphasis sup-
plied).l18 
In a subsequent decision, the Customs Court, without referring to 
Eurasia, indicated that it could issue declaratory judgments but 
declined to do so on the ground that it would be improper under 
the circumstances .179 These are the only two cases dealing with the 
Customs Court's authority to issue declaratory judgments. 
District Court jurisdiction 
As a result of the statutory limitations on Customs Court juris-
diction, certain Customs actions may be reviewable only in a federal 
district court. Suits seeking forfeiture, monetary penalties, or 
liquidated damages under i:i bond are brought in a district court. If 
Customs seizes goods, but has not initiated forfeiture or .condemna-
tion proceedings, the district court has jurisdiction to require Cus-
toms to do so. 180 The Customs Court does not have jurisdiction in 
cases involving forfeiture or penalties, even if a protest against the 
exclusion of mercharttlise has been filed and denied.181 
177 31 C.C.P.A. 202 (I 944). 
178 28 u.s.c. § 2201 (1970). 
170 Moise Products Co. v. United States, 37 Cust. Ct. 135 (1956)(declaratory judgment is 
improper when plaintiff is seeking an interlocutory ruling on law to be applied at adminis-
trative level). It is established that controversies concerning import duties do not concern 
"Federal taxes" and are not outside the Declaratory Judgment Act for that reason. See 
Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 426 U.S. 548 (1976). It is unclear 
what effect, if any, United States v. King, 395 U.S. I (1969), has on this question. There, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Claims, which is also "a court of the United States" 
could not issue declaratory judgments, but that holding was based on the unique position 
and history of the Court of Claims. 
180 In reNo. 32 E. 50-7th St., 96 F.2d ~53, 156 (2d Cir. 1938); In re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561, 
563 (2d Cir. 1930). 
181 United States v. American Metal Co., 12 Ct. Cust. App. 440, 444 (1 925); Sheldon & 
Co. v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. App. 215, 218 (1917); M.M. Scher & Sons, Inc. v. United 
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District Court jurisdiction over other Customs actions is depen-
dent upon an interpretation of Customs Court jurisdiction: district 
courts may take jurisdiction under one of their general or specific 
jurisdictional provisions182 when the Customs Court does not have 
·jurisdiction over the subject matter. This occurs most frequently 
when Customs excludes merchandise under a law that is not a 
custo~s- law-action subject neither to a protest nor to review in 
the Customs Court. Under this scheme, district courts have subject 
matter jurisdiction to review exclusion of merchandise under the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (a decision made by the Food and 
Drug Administration); 183 exclusion of goods such as switchblade 
knives (a decision made by Customs); 184 exclusion of oil pursuant 
to a quota imposed by the President under section 22 of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act; 185 and under former procedures, 
exclusion of goods which allegedly copy a registered trademark (a 
decision made by Customs) .186 
Interestingly, when district courts have jurisdiction over Customs 
action, they may provide immediate relief against unlawful Cus-
toms action before administrative procedures surrounding a pro-
test or petition are completed.187 In those situations, district courts 
States, 24 Cust. Ct. 243 (1950)(mhigated penalty is not an exaction subject to protest or 
review). 
18 2 28 U .S.C. § 1331 (1970) (where matter in controversy "arises under the Constitution, 
laws or treaties of the United States"); id. § 1340 (matters "arising under any Act of Congress 
providing for internal revenue, or revenue from imports or tonnage except matters within 
the jurisdiction of the Customs Court"); id. § 1346(a)(2) ("any other civil action or claim 
against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress"). 
183 Sugarman v. Forbragd, 405 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1968) (review of FDA order 
excluding allegedly adulterated coffee beans); The James]. Hill, 65 F. Supp. 265, 269 (D. 
Md. 1946) (review of FDA order to export or destroy wheat); Goodwin v. United States, 371 
F. Supp. 433, 436 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (exclusion by FDA). 
18
' Precise Imports Corp. v. Kelly, 218 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (exclusion of 
switchblade knives under criminal statute), aff'd, 378 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
u.s. 973 (1967). 
185 C. Tennant Sons & Co. of New York v. Dill, 158 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
186 Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953) (exclusion under trademark 
laws). See also Richard]. Spitz, Inc. v. Dill, 140 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (district court 
has jurisdiction to consider exclusion made under Foreign Assets Control Regulations); 
Carriso, Inc. v. United States, 106 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1939) (district courts have jurisdiction 
to challenge certain navigation fees collected by Customs). 
187 See Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953); Richard]. Spitz, Inc. v. 
Dill, 140 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Indeed, one of the reasons importers attempt to 
invoke district cou~t jurisdiction is to avoid the procedural prerequisites of Customs Court 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., J .C. Penney Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). 
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have greater ability to control administrative action than does the 
Customs Court, which must wait until a protest or petition is filed 
and denied before assuming jurisdiction. 
When the subject matter under challenge is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Customs Court, it is generally held that the 
district court has no jurisdiction,188 even if the Customs Court is 
unable to hear the case because procedural prerequisites have not 
been completed. 189 Cases to. that effect are premised on the notion 
that Congress intended the Customs Court to offer a "complete 
system of corrective justice"190 in matters over which it has juris-
diction. Therefore, the prerequisites for Customs Court review are 
taken as limitations on judicial review of Customs actions by district 
courts. Persons not ·authorized to oetition or orotest subiect matter 
• J J 
within the Customs Court's jurisdiction may not challenge such 
action in the district court. 191 Persons for whom the protest or 
petition procedures might someday be available may not challenge 
Customs action in the district court without invoking those proce-
dures, even if the Customs Court remedy is alleged to be ineffec-
tive .192 
A few decisions have stated that in "exceptional and extraordi-
nary" circumstances a district court might properly enjoin Customs 
Service action if such action threatened irreparable injury, even 
though the subject matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Customs Court. 1 93 However, this exception has never been 
188 See cases cited in note 129 supra. In at least one case, a district court has reviewed 
administrative action that would normally be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Customs Court without considering the jurisdictional issue. Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. 
United States, 355 F. Supp. 466 (D. Minn. I 973) (in declaratory judgment action, court ruled 
that Customs Service had lawfully imposed duties on imported merchandise that was not 
later exported as promised). 
109 See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812, 815 (D.C. Cir. 19771: !.C. 
Penney Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, supra note 174; Fritz v. United States, 535 F.2d 
1192 (9th Cir. 1976). 
190 Argosy, Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14,20-21 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Cottman Co. v. 
Dailey, 94 F.2d 85, 88 (4th Cir. 1938)). 
101 See Kocher v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. I 967), cerl. denied, 391 U.S. 920 ( 1968); 
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the Implementation of Textile 
Agreements, No. 76-1064 (D.C, Cir. Apr. 20, 1977), petition for rehearing denied, (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 2, 1977). 
192 J.C. Penney Co. v. United Stales Treasury Dep't, supra note 187. Cf SCM Corp. v. Int'l 
Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Customs Court must initially rule on its own 
jurisdiction before a district court can proceed to exercise jurisdiction). 
103 E.g., Argosy, Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14,21 (5th Cir. 1968); Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 
94 F.2d 85, 89 (4th Cir. 1938); Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.C.C. 1956). 
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invoked.194 Increasingly courts have recognized that because of the 
limitation on its jurisdiction and power the Customs Court may not 
provide a "complete system of corrective justice" for matters within 
its jurisdiction. Such courts have taken jurisdiction over matters 
seemingly within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court, refusing to 
hold that limitations on Customs Court jurisdiction necessarily 
imply limitations on their own jurisdiction. Thus, even though the 
Customs Court normally reviews administrative action of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury under the Antidumping Act of 1921 and 
.district courts do not/ 95 in Timken Co. v. Simon, 196 the district court 
took jurisdiction over a suit by a U.S. manufacturer to consider 
whether a refusal of the Secretary of the Treasury to exact dump-
ing duties on certain importations was lawful. In affirming, the 
court of appeals reasoned that because the action was not subject to 
a petition under section 516, it was not within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Customs Court, thus rejecting the notion that section 
516 .limits reviewability of actions not specifically subject to review 
through the protect and petition procedures. 
Similarly, in Massachusetts v. Simon 197 the district court took 
jurisdiction over a suit challenging license fees imposed by the 
President on imported oil, even though traditionally the Customs 
Court has reviewed Presidential actions which result in increased 
duties. 198 Although it is not clear from the opinion, jurisdiction 
may have been exercised simply because some of the plaintiffs 
before the court could not have filed a protest or challenged the 
license fees in the district court. These cases suggest that confusion 
concerning the respective jurisdictions of the Customs Court and 
district courts will continue as long as the jurisdiction and powers 
of the Customs Court are narrowly limited. 
194 The narrow scope of this exception is exemplified by Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. 
Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1956), where the court declined to take jurisdiction even though the 
challenged Customs action was alleged to have put plaintiff out of business and Customs 
Court review was alleged to be too untimely to provide effective relief. 
195 See, e.g., Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938); Horton v. Humphrey, 146 
F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1956). Compare 19 U.S.C. § 169 (1970) with id. §1516 (Supp. V 1975). 
196 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
197 No. 75-0129 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, I 975), rev'd sub no~n., Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal 
Energy Administration, 518 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 548 (1976). 
198 United States v. Star Indus., Inc. 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A.) (review of duty assessed on 
brandy imported from Spain), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); United States v. Best Foods, 
Inc., 47 C.C.P.A. 163 (1960) (review of fee imposed on peanuts); United States v. Schmidt 
Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960) (presidential proclamation 
under the escape clause). 
1977] 1147 
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
ANALYSIS AND REcoMMENDATioNs 
Introduction 
Except when it revokes or suspends a broker's license, the Cus-
toms Service acts through informal procedures. Decisions are made 
and actions are taken without a formal record, without an oppor-
tunity to examine or cross-examine witnesses or formally test the 
validity of information, without articulated support for decisions, 
and without an independent decision-maker. In part, Lhese proce-
dures are required by the nature of the work Customs does. Many 
of the functions Customs performs could not be carried out 
through formal adjudicatory proceedings at the administrative 
level. The assessment and collection of duties, for example, would 
absorb an enormous amount of resources if Customs were required 
to establish the classification and value of all merchandise in a 
formal adjudicatory setting. Informal procedures permit the Cus-
toms Service to take action without first demonstrating to an inde-
pendent trier of fact that the information it relies upon is accurate. 
This is generally appropriate because a significant number of issues 
resolved by the Service are relatively easy to decide or are noncon-
troversial. Informal procedures facilitate disposal of most issues 
>vithout controversy, and resolution of most controversies without 
the burdens of formal proceedings. 
On the other hand, much of what Customs does involves adjucli-
cation:199 import specialists, customs inspectors, district directors 
and their staffs, and lawyers at headquarters make (even if they do 
not articulate) findings of fact and apply general standards 
contained in legislation and regulations.200 Accordingly, the pro-
cedural formalities normally associated with a trial-type hearing 
may be important to ensure fair and correct determinations. 
Tension tl1erefure ex.ists bet•vvee11 t11e need for tl1e adn1i11istrative 
systern to be fast and flexible and the need for the safeguards of 
more formal adversary proceedings. Present procedures resolve 
"'" This is generally true whether "adjudication" is defined as broadly as in section 55 I (7) 
of the Administrative Procedure Act ("agency process for the formulation of an order") or 
more narrowly and conventionally as Professor Davis would define it (disposition of an issue, 
other than by rulemaking, involving legal right or legal obligations of named parties). Sec 
Davis, Revisingthe Administrative Procedme Act, 27 An. L. REv. 35, 40 (I977). 
200 As long ago as ISIO, Chief Justice Marshall referred to a customs collector (the official 
who then assessed duties) as a "quasi-judge." Scott v. Negro Ben, I 0 U.S. (6 Cranch) I, 3 
(lSI 0). 
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this tension by combining informal administrative procedures with 
judicial review for those aggrieved by administrative decisions. 
After duties are assessed informally, an importer may protest the 
assessment, and if the protest is denied, challenge the assessment in 
the Customs Court. There, "review" is a hybrid of review and de 
novo adjudication. The Customs Court does not review an adminis-
trative record; decisions are based on a record compiled de novo 
before it.201 But this is not, strictly speaking, a trial de novo because 
the Customs Court does not make an independent determination 
of contested issues. Instead, the action of the Customs Service is 
presumed to be correct and the party challenging that action has 
the burden of proving that the action is incorrect.202 
The administrative-judicial process just described appears to be 
proper in most instances (altl~ough the recommendations of this 
article would eliminate the additional burden of proof now borne 
by parties challenging Customs action). The present informal 
decision-making process should be retained at the administrative 
level so that most issues can be disposed of quickly and flexibly. 
Resolving disputed issues through judicial proceedings rather than 
through formal administrative procedures permits the administra-
tive process to proceed expeditiously, but provides the adversary 
context and procedural formalities which are necessary to assure 
sound decisions and judicial control over Customs action. At the 
same time, the presumption of correctness underlying Customs 
decisions facilitates the informal administrative process by shifting 
the burden of proof to persons challenging Customs action. 
Even though the framework in which issues are raised and re-
solved appears to be sound, much can be done to improve the 
operation of administrative and judicial procedures within that 
framework. The informality of the present administrative process 
used by Customs places a heavier responsibility on the process of 
judicial review than there would otherwise be. A court is the only 
forum in which issues arising from administrative action can be 
decided in an adversary proceeding by an impartial decision-
maker on the basis of an evidentiary record. Accordingly, judicial 
201 However, ·28 U.S.C. § 2632(£) (Supp. V !975) provides that when the summons is 
served the Customs Service is to transmit a copy of certain entry documents, the protest and 
denial thereof, any laboratory reports, and official samples of the merchandise "as part of 
the official record of the civil action" in the Customs Court. 
202 !d. § 2635(a). 
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review should be available and timely, as well as sufficiently broad 
in scope to overturn incorrect administrative action. 
Courts improve the administrative process by creating substan-
tive standards for channelling discretionary action and requiring 
the agency to develop rules, procedures, and statements of poli-
cy.203 The recommendations discussed below would assist the Cus-
toms Court in fulfilling that role by broadening its subject matter 
jurisdiction, increasing its powers to enable it to grant timely relief, 
revising the rules concerning the burden of proof that currently 
preclude the reversal of erroneous administrative action, and mod-
ifying procedures that preclude judicial review in penalty cases. 
There are, however, limits to the ability of a court to structure 
administrative discretion or require an agency to do so; 204 it may be 
too restrained by resources, natural conservatism, or the complex-
ity of the task to control agency discretion effectively. It is likely 
that nonjudicial scrutiny· of administrative procedures themselves 
may yield more productive procedural changes than attention fo-
cused in the context of an adversary proceeding. While it is rec-
ommended that direct attention be given to revising the proce-
dures Customs uses in performing its function, analysis of such 
revision is beyond the scope of this article. 
Courts are also limited in their "ability to improve administrative 
procedures, because their only opportunity to do so is when a 
203 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY jUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 57-59 (1 969); K. DAVIS, 
PoLICE DISCRETION 121-38 (1975); Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L. J. 575 (1972). The 
efficacy of judicial control of informal and discretionary agency action is just beginning to be 
studied. Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 55-64 
(1972). Sofaer Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1293 (1972); Thomforde, Controlling Administrative Sanctions, 74 MicH. L. 
REV. 709, 734-51 (1976); Vicery,Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action: A Case Study of 
Shareholder Proposal Letters, 28 HAST. L.J. 307 (1976); Wright, New Judicial Requisites for 
Informal Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 An. L. REV. 
59 (I 977). 
204 Sofaer, supra note 203, at 1375; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1696 (1 975); Williams, Securing Fairness and Regularity in Administra-
tive Proceedings, 29 An. L. REV. I, 33 (1977). The Supreme Court almost seems to have 
accepted these limitations as precluding effective judicial innovation. See, e.g., Renegotiation 
Bd. v. Grumman Airuaft Eng'r Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975) (agency need not explain 
decisions, even if public interest suffers otherwise); Butz v. Glover Livestock Co., 411 U.S. 
I 82 (1 973) (reversing appeals court decision requiring agency to explain inconsistent deci-
sions); Camp v. Pitts, 4 I I U.S. 138 (l 973) (de novo review of informal adjudication not 
required); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (formal findings 
not required for informal action). But see Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (I 974) (agency must 
let standards be known to avoid reality and appearance of arbitrary denial of benefits). 
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dispute is brought before them. If persons whose interests an 
agency should protect do not, or may not, challenge agency action, 
there is no opportunity for judicial correction.205 This problem is 
particularly significant in the administration of the customs laws. 
Much of what Customs does will go unchallenged if Customs exer-
cises its discretionary powers in favor of its primary and most 
immediate constituency, the ·importers. This is true because many 
persons with interests the Service is designed to protect (e.g., con-
sumers) either lack a sufficient interest to challenge Customs ac-
tions or lack standing to seek administrative or judicial correction 
of erroneous Customs action. The proposals herein would provide 
procedures so that such persons could challenge Customs actions. 
Many of the recommendations included herein would strengthen 
the role of the Customs Court in overseeing substantive and pro-
cedural aspects of Customs activity, sometimes by taking review 
authority away from the district courts. When this is so, it is be-
cause the issues raised require the experience or expertise of the 
Customs Court and because of the advantages in having a unified 
body of customs law established through a national court. 
The question arises whether the Customs Court is qualified for 
the task. It is clear that the recommendations made here will be 
effective only if· the judges of the Customs Court use new authority 
imaginatively and forcefully. Because the quality of appointments 
to the court will influence whether the goals underlying the rec-
ommendations can be achieved, the process of selecting judges 
should be reviewed to ensure that the best possible appointments 
are made. 
As an institution, the Customs Court seems capable of fulfilling 
the role envisioned in this article. The national jurisdiction of the 
court assures uniformity of treatment. The court is well funded 
and staffed. It has the authority to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses and the production of documents, and may punish persons 
for contempt.206 The rules of the Customs Court were revised and 
modernized along the lines of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
soon after passage. of the Customs Court Act of 1970,207 and now 
205 For the view that administrative law should reflect he fact that agencies mediate 
disput~s between various interests see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1671 (1975). 
206 See note 165 and accompanying text supra. 
207 Pub. L. No. 91-271, tit. I, 84 Stat. 274 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
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provide for full discovery and motion procedures. The Act 
strengthened the Customs Court as an institution by enabling the 
court to reduce its substantial backlog of cases.208 These reforms 
not only streamlined Customs Court procedure, but ]eft the re-
sources of the court relatively underutilized. Indeed, one of the 
attractive features of relying on the Customs Court for more judi-
cial control over Customs action is that the court appears able to 
take on new responsibilities without requiring significant additional 
resources. This conclusion is supported by the available statistics209 
and by the fact that some Customs Court judges frequently sit on 
federal district courts. 
If there is a drawback in relying upon the Customs Court for 
strengthened review of Customs action, it is that the Customs 
Court sits primarily in New York City, while district courts are 
more accessible to other ports. Litigants at ports other than New 
York presumably would prefer to challenge Customs actions in 
their local district courts. However, this drawback can be overcome. 
The Customs Court can use its authority to hear cases at places 
other than New York. 210 Some judges of the court might sit per-
manently in locations outside of New York-particularly on the 
West Cost, where customs work has grown mo~t rapidly in recent 
years.211 Finally, the court might experiment with using long dis-
""" Jd. The Act consolidated into one trial issues previously raised in separate consecutive 
trials (one on valuation and a second on classification of merchandise). In addition, the Act 
reduced Customs Court congestion by allowing the Service to revise appraisements while a 
suit is pending in court, by reducing from three to one the number of judges assigned to 
hear cases, by dropping the rule that all protests denied by Customs be referred automat-
ically to the Custorris Court, and by lengthening the time within which a denied protest could 
be appealed, thus decreasing the number of cases appealed by importers merely to preserve 
the possibility of appeal. See H.R. REP. No. 1067, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970). 
209 The statistical information available is difficult to appraise because it does not neces-
sarily reflect factors such as the time spent at trial or difficulty of the issues. Over 23,000 
"cases" were terminated during fiscal year 1976, but many were disposed of collectively by 
trying a single test case. In fact, only 64 cases were tried that year (an average of seven per 
judge), while an additional 869 cases were disposed of on the basis of stipulations or 
dispositive orders. Seventy-three written decisions were published, and 721 decisions were 
made with only short abstracts summarizing the subject matter. See U.S. Customs Court, 
Report for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1976 (1976) (available from the U.S. Customs 
Court, New York, N.Y.). These figures are consistent with statisics concerning the workload 
of the court in prior years. Of course, these figures-which seem to indicate that the court 
has substantial unused judicial resources-do not necessarily reflect the time spent in the 
trial or decision of cases or the time spent on deciding nondispositive motions. 
210 28 u.s.c. § 256 (1970). 
211 Between 1970 and 1975 the total value of foreign trade from West Coast ports-
including both imports and exports-rose 160 percent. For ports in California alone, foreign 
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tance video communications in emergency situations so that liti-
gants can present arguments to the court without appearing in New 
York in person. 
Jurisdiction and Powers of the Customs Court 
1. Customs Court Jurisdiction Without a Protest or Petition 
Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 1582 to broaden the jurisdiction of 
the Customs Court by giving the court exclusive jurisdiction of any civil 
action brought to challenge final agency action (as defined in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act) of the Customs Service. Two types of actions should 
be excepted from this jurisdiction: those specifically subject to review in 
another court, and those pertaining to the exclusion of merchandise under a 
law that is not a customs law taken by the Customs Service on the request or 
at the direction of anotherfederal agency. 
Because under present law a protest by an importer or a petition 
by a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler must be filed 
and denied before the Customs Court has jurisdiction, the ad-
ministrative process at Customs is insulated from challenge in 
the Customs Court until the protest or petition process has run its 
course. Neither Customs action nor inaction can be reviewed or 
controlled by the Customs Court except through those pro-
cedures.212 
This system has three adverse effects. First, it unduly limits the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Customs Court, because final 
Customs action that is not subject to a protest or petition under 19 
U .S.C. § 1514 (1970) is neyer reviewed in the Customs Court.213 
trade increased 20 percent in the first 10 months of 1976, with imports increasing more than 
28 percent. Wall St.]., Jan. 20, 1977, at 1, col. 5. 
212 See text accompanying notes ll2-34 supra. 
213 There are many examples. Refusal to license a broker is not subject to either protest or 
petition or to any other articulated procedure leading to judicial review (although revocation 
or suspension of a broker's license is subject to judicial review). Suspension of immediate 
delivery privileges as well as the amount required to be filed as a bond are not subject to 
protest or petition and therefore are not subject to review in the Customs Court. It has been 
suggested that an importer required to file an unduly large bond might refuse to file the 
bond and then protest the subsequent exclusion of his merchandise (which would follow if 
no bond were filed). However, this is an uncertain and circuitous remedy. One seeking 
review concerning the amount of a bond should not be forced to give up control of his 
merchandise in order to challenge the decision. 
It is not possible or desirable to list all of the Customs actions which are final and which 
would be subject to review in the Customs Court under this recommendation. The purpose 
of the recommendation is to give the Customs Court general jurisdiction to ensure that a 
forum is always available to review final decisions of the Customs Service. 
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Although such actions might be reviewed in a district court,214 
challenges there are inadequate. There is no certainty that the 
district court wiH take jurisdiction; it may not if it concludes that 
the action is within the exdusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court 
or that Congress intended the action to be nonreviewable. 215 
Uncertainty concerning the availability of judicial review is in itself 
sufficient reason to provide for :review of all final actions of the 
Service. Moreover, even assuming that the district court would take 
jurisdiction, Customs Court review would be preferable, since the 
judges of the Custows Court are more familiar with Customs 
procedures and terminology and have a level of expertise not 
possessed by the district court bench. This recommendation would 
therefore expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the Customs 
Court to include review of aH final actions of the Customs Service, 
and would make such jurisdic.tion exclusive. 
The recommendation would also dispel confusion concerning 
review of actions resulting in exclusion of merchandise. Presently, 
exclusion of merchandise under a law that is not a customs law is 
not subject to a protest or to review in the Customs Court, even if it 
is Customs that decides that the merchandise is prohibited o:r 
restricted. Instead, review is in a district court, aithough district 
courts have no sp~cial expertise or experience which favors them as 
a reviewing forum in those cases. Review of Customs exclusion 
decisions should be in the Customs Court so that substantive and 
procedural aspects of all such decisions are uniformly ad-
judicated.216 
A second adverse effect of the limitations on Customs Court 
jurisdiction is that the Customs Court is not authorized to review 
Customs inaction-that is, failure or refusal of Customs to act when 
it should. Normally, the failure of an agency to act when it should 
is considered "agency action" which may be final for purposes of 
judicial review.217 But unlawful inaction at the Customs Service 
ZH See, e.g., Gallagher and Ascher Co. v. Simon, No.76C-3499 (N.D. 111. Oct. 12, 1976) 
(granting temporary restraining order against withdrawal of immediate release privileges). 
"'' See notes 189-90 supra and accompanying text. Sre, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. United 
States Treasury Dep't, supra note 187, at 98. 
216 !-io1.vever, the recommendation would not authorize the Customs Court to review 
exclusion cases for which the court has no special expertise or experience. Obscenity cases, 
for example, would continue to be brought in district courts. The portion of the recommen-
dation governing which exclusion cases will be reviewed in the Customs Court is discussed in 
more detail below. 
217 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1970). See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 
862 (4th Cir. 1961). 
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generally is not subject to protest or petition and therefore is not 
subject to review in the· Customs Court.218 
A significant instance of inaction is refusal or failure of the 
Service to proceed with liquidation when it otherwise could and 
should. Because Customs is not required to complete liquidation 
within any period of time, the courts afford the sole remedy when 
a liquidation (or other action) is unjustifiably delayed. Yet present 
jurisdictional limitations preclude the court from deciding whether 
such inaction is unlawful. Two recent cases challenging delay in 
completing liquidation iBustrate the problem.219 In both cases the 
Customs Court was found to lack jurisdiction since liquidation had 
not taken place, and therefore, no protest had been filed and 
denied. This result should be changed. 
Judicial review is not the only way of controlling unlawful delay 
in agency action. Legislation before the House of Representatives, 
for example, would impose time limits on liquidation decisions. 220 
The recommendation here would not preclude such procedural 
improvements; nor would it be rendered obsolete by them. Judicial 
review of agency inaction is an important control on the 
discretionary functions of administrative agencies and should be 
available with respect to the Customs Service. The Administrative 
Procedure Act requires a reviewing court to "compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,"221 a general 
standard to which the Customs Service should be held. 222 
218 One particularly striking example of erroneous, but unreviewable, Customs inaction is 
provided by United States v. Astra BentWood Furniture Co., 28 C.C.P.A. 205 (1940). There the 
importer was denied Customs Court jurisdiction to challenge the assessment of duties 
because no notice of liquidation had been posted (though plaintiff had received one). 
Customs' failure to post a notice of liquidation was held not subject to a protest and thus not 
subject to challenge in the Customs CGurt. 
219 United States v. Boe, 543 F.2d 151 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (under All Writs Act, Chief Judge 
of Customs Court ordered not to take jurisdiction over case before a protest has been filed 
and denied); Dexter v. United States, 11 CusT. BuLL. 50 (Cust. Ct. Feb. 9, 1977) (Customs 
Court has no jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to consider whether liquidation is unrea-
sonably withheld). 
220 Under the legislation,, merchandise not liquidated within! year of entry or withdrawal 
from a warehouse is deemed liquidated at the amount of duties paid at the time of entry or 
withdrawal, unless the time is extended to obtain additional information or liquidation is 
suspended pursuant to statute or court order. H.R. 8149, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 218 (1977). 
221 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). 
222 At least one district court has taken jurisdiction and ordered Customs to proceed with 
appraisement. In Alto Plastics Mfg. Co. v. Hann, No. 70-2056-JWG (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 1971), 
the district court found that Customs had "unreasonably delayed appraisement" and or-
dered that appraisement be completed, basing jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). The 
fact that district courts might be available to provide relief in such instances does not detract 
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Limited Customs Court jurisdiction produces a third adverse 
effect-inability of the system to afford protection against 
irreparable injury in the customs context. As George Bronz, a 
former leader of the customs bar, has said: 
If Customs officers exclude merchandise from entry or 
delivery, the importer cannot always wait four months for 
administrative reconsideration, plus an even longer period 
for a full-scale trial and decision by the Customs Court. 
An importer with an unresolved duty issue can assume the 
financial risk, and continue his imports. An importer 
whose product is refused entry must suspend his business 
until the conclusion of judicial proceedings. Apart from 
the expense of warehousing in bond, the merchandise 
may be perishable, or, when quotas are involved, the 
quota period may run out. Today, the importer has no 
:real access to judicial review in such cases. 223 
The recommendation here would permit the Customs Court to 
provide timely relief if exclusion (or other Customs action) 
threatens irreparable injury where the normal protest process has 
not been completed. 
Basing Customs Court jurisdiction on the denial of a protest or 
petition is consistent with the general principle that administrative 
remedies should be exhausted before action is subject to review. In 
most routine cases involving review of duty assessments this 
premise is appropriate since importers are guaranteed a refund if 
they have overpaid estimated duties, and there is generally little 
harm in delay. The exhaustion principle thus avoids disruption of 
the administrative process. However, there are recognized 
exceptions and qualifications to that principle which permit courts 
from the importance of the recommendation. here. The remedy in a district court is 
uncertain; district court might hold that the matter is within the exclusive (but unobtainable) 
jurisdiction of the Customs Court. See notes 189-90 supra. 
"
3 Hearings on S. 2624 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in judicial Machinery of the Senate 
Cmmn. on the judiciary, 9Jst Cong., ]st Sess. 205 (1969) (statement of George Bronz). See also 
address by George Branz, Second judicial Conference of the United States Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (May 29, 1 975), reprinted in 69 F.R.D. ll 9, 18!-88 ( 1976). The 
American Bar Association, without recommending an expansion in the jurisdiction of the 
Customs Court, has recommended that Congress authorize the court to "assume jurisdiction 
prior to the otherwise required exhaustion of all administrative remedies to prevent irrepar-
able injury." That principle is incorporated in legislation now before the Senate. S. 1430, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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to reVIew agency action before all administrative remedies have 
been exhausted,224 particularly when the administrative remedy is 
inadequate because it fails to offer relief commensurate with the . 
plaintiffs claim225 or to protect against irreparable injury.226 The 
recommendation here, by adopting the more flexible concept of 
final agency action from the Administrative Procedure Act,227 
incorporates these considerations. 
The deficiencies in Customs Court review that result from the 
jurisdictional prereqms1te of · a denied protest or peti-
tion-limitations on subject matter jurisdiction, ·inability to 
review Customs inaction, and inability to protect against 
irreparable injury-operate with respect to all of the Customs 
functions described in this article, as well as to other Customs 
actions for which there is no judicial review. The recommendation 
would correct. these deficiencies by giving the Customs Court 
authority to review Customs action outside of the normal 
procedure, while preserving the protest and petition procedures 
for those cases to which they are applicable. The question of 
standing to challenge final agency actions which are subject to 
review is addressed separately below. 
Two types of cases would be exempted ·from the ex.panded 
jurisdiction of the Customs Court. The first, cases specifically 
subject to review in another court, includes several types of 
administrative action not reviewable in the Customs Court: actions 
under the Freedom of Information Act (now subject to review in a 
district court); actions involving personnel (now subject to review in 
the Court of Claims); and actions revoking or suspending a 
broker's license (now subject to review in a court of appeals). This 
proviso, particularly as it pertains to the revocation or suspension 
of brokers' licenses, was not based upon a decision that present 
224 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 446 (1976); B. ScHWAR'IZ, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAw § 173 (1976). See Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative 
Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J. 817, 859 (1976). 
225 The phrase is that of Professor Jaffe. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AcTION 426 (1965), citing Skinner and Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919) (to 
attack ICC authorization of railroad rates without a hearing it is not necessary to seek 
remedy in administrative proceedings) arul R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127 (D.C. 
Cir. 1962) (to attack order requiring petition for exemption from securities registration 
requirements it is not necessary to first seek such an exemption). 
226 See, e.g., Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat'! Bituminous Coal Comm., 306 U.S. 56 (1939) (in q:mrse 
of proceeding, agency proposes to reveal a document claimed to contain confidential infor-
mation). 
227 Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 865-66 (4th Cir. 1961). 
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judicial review procedures are adequate. More adequate review 
might be had in the Customs Court or the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, particularly of revocation or suspension of brokers' 
licenses. Contemplation of such a change, however, would require 
a much more thorough review of the subject than the scope of this 
article would allow. 
The second exemption is more complicated. Under present law, 
decisions to exdude merchandise may be made by the Customs 
Service, the President, the International Trade Commission, or one 
..f h. £' L _L ..J 1 " A 11 1 1 " " · oA_ a :numuer 01 otuer 1euera1 ageilCies . .n..u sucr1 aet.1s1ons are Im-
plemented by the Customs Service. For purposes of review, 
present law distinguishes between exclusion under a customs law 
and exclusion under other laws. If exclusion is pursuant to a 
customs law, :review is obtained by filing a protest and appealing 
denial of the protest to the Customs Court, rather than to a district 
court. This is true whether the exclusion decision is made by the 
Customs Service (e.g., by interpreting the statute requiring 
country-of-origin marking) or by the President (e.g., by imposing a 
quota). Where exclusion is under a law that is not a customs law, no 
protest may be filed and therefore the Customs Court has no 
jurisdiction, even if the exclusion decision is made by the Customs 
Service (e.g., under the law ba:r:rir1g switchblade knives) rather than 
by another agency. 
The recommendation and the second exemption would change 
this scheme in only one respect. As previously mentioned, each 
exclusion decision made by the Customs Service would be subject 
to review in the Customs Court rather than in a district court, 
whether taken pursuant to a customs law or a law that is not a 
customs law. The recommendation would not change the forum 
for review in other exclusion cases. Exclusion decisions by the 
President or another agency under a customs law would continue 
to be subject to protest and review in the Customs Court. This is 
desirabie because such cases raise trade policy issues which the 
Customs Court is well suited to hear. Exclusion decisions by other 
agencies or by a court pursuant to a law that is not a customs law 
would be subject to review in the forum in which they are presently 
reviewed.228 These cases generally :raise issues for which the 
Customs Court has no expertise and which usually are decided by 
"" Thus, obscenity cases under 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970) would continue to be brought in 
district courts rather than the Customs Court. 
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the district court when the law is applied to domestic goods. 
Consequently, there would be no advantage and some dis-
advantages to transferring jurisdiction over such cases to the 
Customs Court.229 
2. Power to Enjoin or Compel Actions 
Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 1581 to confer upon the Customs 
Court the remedial powers of a district court in respect of actions properly 
pending before it. 
This recommendation is a corollary to the preceding rec-
commendation expanding the jurisdiction of the Customs Court. 
Both the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals have taken a narrow view of the powers of the Customs 
Court. Decisions refer to the lack of "equity power" of the court 
and raise doubts about the ability of the court to provide effective 
relief in appropriate cir.cumstances under the All Writs Act or the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.230 To the extent that such decisions are 
premised on the fact that the court may provide no relief until the 
protest or petition procedure has been completed, they would be 
modified by the previous recommendation. To the extent that such 
decisions indicate that the judicial power of the court is inferior to 
that of other courts, they would be changed by this recommen-
dation. To the extent that such decisions reflect a judgment on the 
merits concerning the claim before the court, they would not be 
modified. 
The proposed change is necessary to ensure that the Customs 
Court can provide timely and effective relief by, for example, 
"compel[ling] agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed;"231 "postpon[ing] the effective date of agency action or 
preserv[ing] the status or rights" of persons pending appeal; 232 
issuing writs in aid of its jurisdiction;233 or declaring the rights and 
other legal relations of· parties before it in any case of actual 
controversy within its jurisdiction.234 The recommendation is ex-
pressed broadly so that the court may not disclaim the authority to 
229 This Article does not address the adequacy of judicial review of exclusion decisions 
made by agencies other than the Customs Service. 
230 See notes 169-79 supra and accompanying text. 
231 5 u.s.c. § 706(1) (1970). 
232 Jd: § 705. 
233 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1970). 
234 ld. § 2201. 
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grant proper relief in appropriate cases. hs language is adopted 
from a proposal of the American Bar Association which has been 
incorporated in legislation introduced by Senator DeConcini.235 
3. Political Affiliation of Court Appointees and Selection of the C!n:ef 
Judge 
Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 251 to delete the requirement that 
not more than five of the nine Judges of the Customs Court be appointed 
from the same political . party and to provide that the chi if judge be 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The Customs Court is unique among Article III courts in the 
selection of its judges and chief judge. Section 251 of Title 28 of 
the U.S. Code requires that not more than five of the nine judges 
of the Customs Court be appointed from the same political party 
and that the chief judge be. selected by the President. Both re-
quirements were originally enacted when the Board of General 
Appraisers (the precursor of the Customs Court) was established in 
1890 as a quasi-administrative, quasi-judicial body to review 
classification and valuation of imports.236 The Board of General 
A • 1 1 • • 1" • l 1 1 r'J<:J7 11 • ...,. J""'.n..f"" n..ppralsers evotvea mto a JUOicia ooaT~ ana m 1 ::~zo was re-
named the Customs Court, but the provisions concerning the polit-
ical affiliation of its judges and the appointment of a chief judge 
were never changed. They are outdated, unnecessary, and incon-
sistent with the notion of an impartial judiciary. 
235 S. 1430, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See 123 CoNG. REc. S6787 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 
1977). Similar legislation was introduced in the previous session of Congress by Senator 
Hruska. S. 3871, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976). See 122 CoNG. REc. S17,121 (daily ed. Sept. 
29, 1976). 
236 Customs Administrative Act of june 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131 (1890) 
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1970)). See generally W. FuTRELL, THE HISTORY or 
AMERICAN CUSTOMS juRISPRUDENCE 136-37 (1941); R. SMITH, CUSTOMS VALUATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 131 (1948). 
237 The evolution of u~e Board of Genera! .. A ... ppraisers from an administrative-judiciai 
body to a judicial body was recognized in Stone v. Whitridge, 129 F. 33 (4th Cir. 1904), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135 (1905) ("the Board is an 
independent tribunal, empowered by law to pass upon certain controversies between the 
Government and the importer, and in this respect the Board is no more subordinate to the 
Treasury Department than is any other Court"). Thereafter, in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff 
Act, ch. 6, § 28, 'if !2, 36 Stat. ll (1909) (repealed 1913), Congress gave the Board "ali the 
powers of a circuit court of the United States;" in the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 518, 42 
Stat. 972 (1922), the Board was given all the powers of a district court to preserve order, 
compel attendance of witnesses and production of evidence, and punish for contempt; and 
in the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 518, 46 Stat. 737 (1930) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
252 (1970)), the judges of the Customs Court were given life tenure, subject to good 
behavior, thus rendering them immune to executive removal. 
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It is recommended that the language concerning the political 
affiliation of court appointees be deleted by Congress.238 The ap-
pointment of a chief judge should follow one of the methods used 
with respect to other courts. The chief judges of the. Court of 
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are ap-
pointed by the President, with the .advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, and hold office for their judicial tenure.239 In the courts of 
appeals and district courts, the chief judge is a judge in regular 
service "who is senior in commission and under seventy years of 
age."24o 
Because of the significant responsibilities and authority of the 
chief judge, it is proposed that the chief judge of the Customs 
Court, like the chief judge of the other national courts, be ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The chief judge of the Customs Court supervises administration of 
the court;241 promulgates the dockets, designates the judge or (in 
three-judge cases) judges to try cases, and reassigns them "when 
circumstances so warrant;"242 decides when three-judge courts are 
appropriate,243 and assigns judges to hear cases at other ports or in 
foreign countries.244 These responsibilities make it desirable that 
the selection of the chief judge be made with a view to his adminis-
trative abilities, which is only possible if the chief judge is an 
appointee.245 
Standing to Seek Administrative and judicial Review 
Congress should amend 19 U.S. C. § 1516 to allow any person adversely 
affected by an incorrect determination of the appraised value or classifica-
238 This recommendation is now before Congress inS. 1430, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 
following a similar recommendation of the American Bar Association. 
230 28 U .S.C. § 171 ( 1970) (Court of Claims); id. § 211 (Court of Customs and Patent. 
Appeals). 
240 28 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (courts of appeals); id. § 136 (district courts). 
241 28 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1970). 
242 Id. § 255(b)-(c). Three-judge courts are provided whenever the action "(I) raises an 
issue of the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, a proclamation of the President or an 
Executive order; or (2) has broad or significant implications in the administration or in-
terpretation of the Customs laws." Id. § 255(a). 
w 28 u.s.c. § 255 (1970). 
244 ld. § 256. 
245 This proposal is similar to one under consideration by the Department of Justice. The 
Department's proposal, however, would require the d1ief judge selected by the President to 
step down as chief judge when he reached the age of 70. 
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tion of, or rate of duty assessed upon, imported merchandise to obtain from 
the Customs Service irifonnation concerning such decision and to petition for 
a change. Denials of such petitions should be reviewable in the Customs 
Court. 
Congress should enact a new statutory provision giving any person 
adversely affected by an action of the Customs Service concerning mer-
chandise that is (or should be) excluded from enlly or delivery, a means of 
seeking administrative review of such action. Subsequent review in the 
Customs Court should be provided. However, such a procedure should not 
be available to challenge action excluding merchandise upon request or 
order addressed to the Customs Service by a court or another federal agency 
taken under a law that is not a customs law. 
If Congress broadens the jurisdiction of the Customs Court as recom-
mended above it should also provide that actions within the bmadened 
jurisdiction may be brought by any adversely affected person who has 
exhausted his administrative remedies. 
Public participation in the administrative process has been called 
one of the "cornerstones for contemporary administrative law and 
for the future." 246 But public participation has not been a notice-
able part of the administrative process at the Customs Service. This 
is unfortunate. The Customs Service makes decisions that affect 
many interests, including those of importers, competing U.S. com-
panies, foreign suppliers and exporters, and purchasers of im-
ported merchandise. VJhen those interests are adversely affected, 
Customs' action should be subject to challenge through adminis-
trative procedures and judicial review. These recommendations 
would revise the laws which preclude such challenges.247 
Presently, the only formal means of seeking administrative re-
view of decisions made by the Customs Service is to file a protest or 
petition. Protests may be filed only by the importer or consignee of 
'·'H Williams, Securing Fairness and Regularity in J!dminisl.ral.ivc Proceedings, 29 AD. L. REV. 1, 
J 5 (J 977). 
"·" The Customs Service has procedures to provide "interested parties" with an adminis-
trative ruling setting forth "a definitive interpretation of applicable law, or other appropriate 
information." 19 C.F.R. § 177 .I ( 1977); see text accompanying notes 71-73 supra. This 
procedure is not a substitute for the right to challenge Customs action, however, and is often 
inadequate because of delays in issuing rulings. The rulings are only given to persons "with a 
direct and demonstrable interest in the question or questions presented;" they are issued 
only with respect to prospective transactions to a person who submits all relevant .facts; and 
they are not subject to re\~ew until after they are applied to particular transactions. ! 9 C.F.R. 
§ J 77 (J 977). As a result, rulings are of little value to a person not directly involved in the 
transaction for which the ruling is sought. 
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the merchandise subject to the protestetl' Customs action, by their 
agents,248 or by a person to whom merchandise placed in a bonded 
warehouse has been tran:sferred.249 A petition may be filed only by 
a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler of the same class or 
kind of merchandise as that affected by the Customs action chal-
lenged. Moreover, the petition procedures allow challenges to only 
three types of action: (1) decisions concerning the classification or 
appraised value of, or rate of duty on, merchandise; (2) decisions 
not to impose countervailing or antidumping duties; and (3) de-
terminations that merchandise is not being, or is not likely to be, 
sold at less than fair value under the Antidumping Act of 1921, or 
has not received a bounty or grant under the Countervailing Duty 
Act. U.S. manufacturers, producers, and wholesalers seeking to 
challenge Customs actions concerning a class of merchandise in 
which they do not deal, and other persons wishing to challenge 
Customs action through the administrative process, have no means 
of doing so. _ 
Similar limitations restrict standing to seek judicial review of 
Customs actions. The Customs Court has no jurisdiction to review 
Customs action unless a protest or petition has been denied by 
Customs. District courts may take jurisdiction over Customs actions 
that are not in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court, 250 
but the Customs Court, because of its expertise and continuing 
control of Customs actions, would provide a better forum for 
review. Moreover, district courts have no jurisdiction over actions 
subject to a protest or petition procedure (since review of such 
actions is exclusively in the Customs Court) even if the plaintiff is 
not authorized to file a protest or petition.251 In short, many per-
sons who may be adversely .affected by decisions of the Customs 
Service have no effective means of challenging those decisions at 
either the administrative or the judicial level. These recommenda-
tions would provide such means. 
248 19 U .S.C. § 1514 (1970). 
249 ld. § 1557(b). 
250 See, e.g., Tim ken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. I 976) (suit to challenge failure 
to withhold appraisement under the Antidumping Act). 
251 See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the Implementa-
tion of Textile Agreements, No. 76-1064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1977), petition for rehearing 
denied (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1977)(discussed in text accompanying notes 253-55 infra); Kocher 
v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968) (discussed in note 
257 infra). 
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To understand the impact of these proposals, one should con-
sider the effect they would have on those who may be adversely 
affected by Customs actions-U.S. manufacturers, producers, and 
wholesalers, competing importers, foreign suppliers, and consum-
ers. U.S. companies whose products compete with imported mer-
chandise have an important stake in decisions made by the Cus-
toms Service. Indeed, many of the laws administered by Customs 
were enacted to protect such firms. But a U.S. manufacturer, 
pr()ducer, or wholesaler may. challenge Customs actions under the 
petition provisions of section 516 only if he deals in the same class 
or kind of merchandise as that to which the challenged action 
pertains. As a result, .a cattle producer may not challenge duty 
assessments on imported hides or leather goods (a different class or 
kind of merchandise), even if his sales to producers of hides suffer 
because imports are facilitated. by erroneous Customs action. Simi-
larly, a manufacturer of steel may not challenge duty assessments 
on auto bodies even if he is injured when Customs fails to collect 
the proper duties.252 
The recommendation would amend section 516 so that any ad-
versely affected person could challenge decisions on classification, 
rates of duty, and appraisement. 
The types of decisions U.S. companies may challenge formally 
also are restricted. The procedures undersection 516 do not pro-
vide for challenges to the admission of merchandise or to ·the 
procedures Customs employs to inspect, assess, weigh, or otherwise 
process merchandise. Yet those actions, if erroneous or inadequate, 
could adversely affect U.S. businesses which Congress intended to 
protect through many of the trade laws. 
This proposal also would authorize standing for persons who 
buy merchandise from importers: manufacturers, wholesalers, re-
tailers, and consumers. Such persons are not authorized to file a 
protest or petition or otherwise challenge Customs action, d~spite 
the fact that they may be injured by the actions-for example, 
decisions concerning duties directly affect the price of merchan-
dise, and decisions to exclude merchandise directly affect both 
availability and price. Normally, interests of these persons are pro-
252 No case has been found which directly raises this issue, but the statute seems fairly 
clear on this point. The term "class or kind" of merchandise is not defined in section 516 or 
any other provision of the customs laws, although it is used in other provisions. E.g., 19 
U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975). 
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tected by importers (who are affected most directly by the deci-
sions). However, importers may have neither resources nor incen-
tive to challenge erroneous Customs action,. especially if they can · 
pass price increases on to their customers or otherwise avoid the 
impact of the decisions. Thus, customers of importers may be left 
without a remedy against erroneous Customs, action. 
In Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the 
Implementation of Textile Agreements, 253 for example, Consumers 
Union brought suit in a district court to challenge t~xtile quotas 
imposed by the President under Section 204 of the Agricultural 
Act of 1956. After questioning the plaintiffs standing to sue in 
federal court, 254 the Court of Appeals directed dismissal of the case 
because the subject matter--exclusion of merchandise under a. cus-
toms law255-was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs 
Court. Howeve;, the Customs Court may not ;be able to hear the 
case. If Consumers Union itself does not import the ·textiles subject 
to a quota, it may not file a protest against the exclusion of the 
textiles, and therefore, may not seek review of the exclusion in the 
Customs Court. Under these circumstances, there may be no court 
available to adjudicate the claim made by Consumers Union. 
Foreign suppliers also have an important stake in decisions made 
by the Customs Se~ice, but have no means of challenging such 
decisions. Customs decisions to increase duties or exclude mer-
chandise may cost them outlets for their merchandise by causing 
importers to switch suppliers. If this occurs, there is no sound 
253 No. 76-1064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1977),petitionfor rehearing denied (D.C.. Cir. Sept. 20, 
1977). 
254 The Court of Appeals intimated that plaintiffs interest in the matter was too indirect 
and not within the relevant ''zone of interest" since plaintiffs purchases of textiles were for 
testing purposes rather than consumer use. !d. slip op. at 6. 
255 This is the first case holding that merchandise excluded under a quota imposed by the 
President is excluded under the provisions of a customs law. A case cited by the court, W. 
Dairy Products, Inc. v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 568 (Cust. Ct. 1974),a.fj'd, 510 F.2d 376 
(C.C.P.A. 1975), involved review of a classification decision that triggered a licensing restric-
tion imposed by the President, but not re'!iew of the licensing restriction itself. Compa'fe 
Massachusetts v. Simon, No. 75-0192 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1975), rev'd sub nom., Algonquin SNG, 
Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 518 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U~S. 548 
(1976) (reviewing license fees imposed by President on imported oil and petroleum prod-
ucts) with cases cited in note 186 supra. The Customs Court has traditionally ~;eviewed 
Presidential action that results in increased duties. United States v. Best Foods, Inc., 47 
C.C.P.A. 163 (1960) (fee imposed on peanuts); United States v. Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47 
C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960) (Presidential proclamation under the escape 
clause); Star Indus., Inc. v. United States, 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 
(1972) (Presidential proclamation suspending certain trade agreement concessions). 
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reason for prohibiting foreign suppliers from challenging the ac-
tion. Foreign suppliers are an important source of competition and 
provide consumers with many products which could not otherwise 
be obtained. When Customs is erroneously protectionist, these 
companies should not be barred from protecting their own and 
their customers' interests. 
The most controversial aspect of this recommendation is that it 
would enable importers to challenge Customs decisions made with 
respect to the merchandise of competing importers. Under present 
law, only the importer or consignee of merchandise may protest 
decisions concerning that merchandise. Other importers may not, 
and therefore may not seek review in the Customs Court. More-
over, since such decisions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Customs Court,256 district .courts do not have jurisdiction to 
review them. But an importer may be i~ured by Customs decisions 
concerning the merchandise of his competitor. The adversely af-
fected importer, like the adversely affected domestic competitor, 
should be afforded an opportunity to challenge the decision. 
There have been two principal objections to this proposal. The 
first is that there is neither pressing need nor demonstrable sup-
port for it. Importers, it is claimed, have other means of protecting 
their interests. If Customs mal~ces a decision that favors one import-
er over another importing the same merchandise, the second 
importer usually can protect his interest by seeking (through the 
protest procedure) to have his merchandise treated in the same 
manner. However, this is not always true. Customs may appraise 
one importer's merchandise at the correct value, but appraise that 
of another at an incorrectly low value; the first importer could 
neither successfully challenge the correct appraisement of its own 
merchandise nor eliminate the advantage given its competitor by 
the erroneous decision. The same situation can arise if the two 
companies import different, but nonetheless competing, mer-
chandise (e.g., copper and aluminum). 257 
256 See, e.g., Kocher v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641, 642-43 (D.C. Cir: 1 967), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
920 (1968). 
257 See, e.g., id. There Customs decided to permit duty-free treatment for watch ITJOVe-
ments imported from the Virgin Islands. T.D. 54,821(2), 94 TREAS. DEc. 154 (1959). 
Appellant was an importer of Swiss watches who claimed "injury in his business relations" as 
a result of this allegedly unlawful interpretation of the statute. 397 F.2d at 642. Yet 
plaintiffs suit was dismissed because exclusive jurisdiction over the matter (the assessment of 
duties) was in the Customs Court. Plaintiff, who could not sue in the Customs Court, was 
denied any effective remedy. 
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The second objection raised to this proposal is that the proce-
dures could be used to harass competitors or seek confidential 
business information. Importers, in particular, are concerned that 
competitors might seek the names of foreign suppliers or informa-
tion concerning prices or costs-information which is asserted to be 
of commercial value.258 · 
A partial response to these concerns is that for 50 years U.S. 
manufacturers, producers, and wholesalers have beeri authorized 
to challenge Customs duty assessments,259 but there is no evidence 
that such procedures have been misused. Although importers may 
have more incentive than U.S. manufacturers, producers, or 
wholesalers to learn the sources and commercial practices of their 
importing rivals, the apparent lack of abuse of existing procedures 
suggests that concerns about the disclosure of confidential infor-
mation may be exaggerated. 
More importantly, procedures already adopted by the Customs 
Service and the Customs Court to protect information that is 
legitimately confidential reduce the likelihood that the standing 
procedures recommended here would be abused. Customs will not 
disclose to any person "information pertaining to trade secrets, 
business operations, and commercial or financial information of 
importers, exporters, and other persons who transact Customs 
business."260 SpecificaJly: 
Information contained in invoices, entries, vessel man-
ifests, export declarations, official reports of investigating 
officers, records pertaining. to the licensing of and the 
revocation or suspension of a license of a customhouse 
broker, and other papers or documents filed with Customs 
officers for any official purpose which contain trade se-
crets, or commercial or financial information, is exempt 
from disclosure except for the purpose for which such 
documents are required to be filed. 261 
25
'. Similar concerns have been raised with respect to the disclosure of confidential busi-
ness information under the Freedom of Information Act. For a comparison, see Patten and 
Weinstein, Disclosure of Business Secrets under the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Lim-
itations, 29 An. L. REv.l93 (1977). 
259 Act of September 21, 1922, ch. 356, tit. IV,§ 516, 42 Stat. 970 (current version at 19 
u.s.c. § 1516(b) (1970)). 
260 
·1 9 C.F.R. § 103.!0(c) (I 977). This Freedom of Information Act rule is also applied to 
requests for information filed by a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler under 
section 516. Id. § 175.2l(b). · 
26
' 19 C.F.R. § 103.1p(d)(l) (1977). 
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Moreover, confidential information developed in connection v1~th 
an investigation under the Antidumping Act of 1921 is exempt 
from disclosure262 and criminal penalties may be imposed for the 
unauthorized release of confidential information by government 
employees.263 The Customs Court will also protect the con-
fidentiality of information. The statute which would be amended 
pursuant to these recommendations provides that "in an action 
instituted by an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler, 
the plaintiff may not inspect any documents or papers of a con-
signee or importer disclosing any information which the Customs 
Court deems unnecessary or improper to be disclosed."264 This has 
been applied in cases brought by U.S. manufacturers, producers, 
and wholesalers wherein the Customs Court has issued protective 
orders restricting information developed through discovery to at-
torneys and experts for the parties. 265 These procedures decrease 
the likelihood that broadening standing to challenge Customs ac-
tion would result in disclosure of confidential information. 
The recommendation made here does not specifically identify 
the persons who could challenge Customs actions. Rather, it adopts 
the general standard of the Administrative Procedure Act that 
persons adversely affected by an administrative action may chal-
lenge that action.266 In many instances, the firms discussed above 
would be considered adversely affected because they would be 
within the "zone of interests"267 protected by the statutes enforced 
by Customs and would be injured in fact. 268 The ultimate determi-
nation of standing would be a judicial decision. This recommenda-
tion is intended to lower the procedural barriers that now prevent 
the operation of that judicial process. 
Persons adversely affected by actions now subject to challenge 
'"' 19 U .S.C. § 160(d)(3) (Supp. V 1975). 
'"' 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970). 
'"·' 28 U .S.C. § 2637 (1970). 
265 CusT. CT. R. 6.l(c). See, e.g., A.S.G. Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 76-3-00667 
(Cust. Ct. May I 0, 1977) (order granting defendant's motion for protective order). 
2
"
6 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). 
267 See Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, !53 ( 1970). 
200 See aiso Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (farmers eligible for government 
payments have standing to challenge validity of regulation expanding circumstances in 
which payments may be assigned); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 ( 1970) (regula-
tions concerning national banks may be challenged by nonregulated competitors); United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (I 973) (general 
member of public has standing if he alleges "that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly 
harmed by the challenged agency action"). 
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under section 516 would use the administrative procedures already 
available. For those adversely affected by action excluding or ad-
mitting merchandise, the recommendation provides both new ad-
ministrative procedures to challenge that action and subsequent 
judicial review. For those affected by any other final agency action, 
the recommendations of this Article permit suit in the. Customs 
Court once administrative remedies are exhausted. These propos-
als do not attempt to articulate what those remedies would be, but 
instead would permit the Customs Service to design the adminis-
trative remedy most appropriate in the context of the action subject 
to challenge. 
Burden of Proof in the Customs Court 
Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 2635(a) to revise the Customs 
Court's standard oj- review in the following way: The presumption of 
correctness of Customs Service decisions, and th~ imposition upon the party 
challenging a decision of the burden of proving otherwise would be re-
tained. However, the additional requirement (read into the statute by the 
Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) that the 
challenging party prove not only that the Customs Service was wrong; but 
also what a correct decision would be, would be eliminated. 
Specifically, the amended statute should provide that, if the Customs 
Court determines that action taken by the Customs Service is erroneous, the 
court will modify or set aside such action; if the court is able to determine 
what action is correct, it should so determine and order that the correct 
action be taken; if the court cannot determine what action is correct, it 
should remand the case to the Customs Service with instructions to take 
action consistent with the decision of the court. Any redetermination made by 
the Customs Service pursuant to a remand should be subject to a new protest 
or petition, and any decision by the Customs Court to remand a case should 
be ·appealable. 
This recommendation is necessary to eliminate an anomaly in 
Customs Court judicature that precludes the court from revers-
ing or modifying Customs Service actions found to be erroneous. A 
plaintiff challenging Customs action in the Customs Court has a 
dual burden of proof: he must first overcome a statutory pre-
sumption that the Customs action was correct, and if successful, he 
must prove what action would have been correct. Curiously, if the 
plaintiff proves only that the action of the Customs Service was 
incorrect, the court neither modifies the action nor remands the 
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case to the Customs Service. Rather, the action is permitted to 
stand unless the plaintiff also proves what the correct action should 
have been. As a result, even after Customs Court review admittedly 
incorrect Customs action often remains uncorrected under this 
system. 
The origins of the dual burden of proof are obscure. The pre-
sumption of correctness of Customs actions arises from 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2635(a), which provides that in matters before the Customs Court: 
"The decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, or his delegate, is 
presumed to be correct, and the burden to prove otherwise shall 
rest upon the party challenging a decision." Although the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals has cited this provision as authority 
for requiring the party chaUenging Customs action to prove the 
correct decision as well,269 in fact the dual burden of proof had 
been judicially imposed before this provision was enacted in 1930. 
The Tariff Act of 1909 instructed the Board of Genera] Appraisers 
(the precursor of the Customs Court) to "proceed by all reasonable 
ways and means in [its]power to ascertain, estimate and determine 
the dutiable value of the imported merchandise, and in so doing 
[to] exercise both judicial and inquisitorial functions." 270 Because 
the Act contemplated that the Board would make its own 
determination rather than simply review the determination of Cus-
toms, the Board assigned the importer the burden of supporting a 
final determination.271 The Board did not alter this procedure 
when it became a court of review in 1922. 
Several cases illustrate the inequity of placing this dual burden of 
proof on the plaintiff.272 Proof of valuation and classification is too 
1
"
9 Hayes-Sammons Chemical Co. v. United States, 55 C.C.P.A. 69 ( !968); Minkap of 
California, Inc. v. United States, 55 C.C.P.A. I (!967); United States v. Acme Steel Co., 51 
C. C.P.A. 8! ( !964); Kobe Import Co. v. United States, 43 C. C.P.A. 136 ( 1956). Moreover, 
although Customs may estimate the amount of duties on the basis of reasonable evidence, 
the plaintiff must prove every material issue by a preponderance of the evidence in order to 
satisfy his burden. Globemaster Midwest, Inc. v. United States, 337 F. Supp. <165 (Cust. Ct. 
1971); Park Ave. Imports v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 528 (Cust. Ct. 1969). 
270 Tariff Act of !909, ch. 6, § 28(13), 36 Stat. II (1909). 
271 !d. See United States v. Edsen Keith 8c Co., 5 Ct. Cust. App. 82 ( 1 91'1). 
'
72 In Dana Perfumes, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d 750 (C.C.P.A. !975), the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals found that Customs erroneously calculated the cost of produc-
tion of imported merchandise by including the usual general expenses--Dr overhead--Df 
selling in the country of exportation, rather than including (as it should have) the usual 
general expenses incurred for products to be exported. Because the importer could not 
prove the amount of usual general expenses for exports-which would have required the 
importer to prove expenses incurred by other exporters-the erroneous Customs decision 
was affirmed. Cases of this type are not uncommon. See, e.g., United States v. T.D. Downing 
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difficult to require it as a. prerequisite for the successful challenge 
of Customs decisions. For instance, a plaintiff required to prove 
"usual general expenses" may not have access to the information 
necessary to prove the expenses incurred by foreign exporters. 
Similarly, proof of "United States value" would require proof of 
the price at which such or similar merchandise (not just that of the 
importer) is freely sold in the United States, plus proof of proper 
allowances for "usual" commissions or profits, the "usual" cost of 
transportation, and similar factors. Proving these dollar amounts 
can be an exceedingly difficult task.273 The unfairness of the rule is 
increased by the fact that Customs itself need only "estimate" on 
the basis of the best available evidence.274 An additional considera-
tion is that Customs often has readier access to the necessary 
information than does the importer.275 
Because of the dual burden of proof, importers and U.S. com-
petitors are inhibited from challenging Customs decisions, thus re-
ducing the effectiveness of judicial review in assuring that Customs 
decisions are correct and fair. Since there is no good reason for 
requiring the party challenging Customs action to prove what the 
correct action should be, the rule should be changed. If after trial 
the Customs Court lacks the information necessary to determine 
the correct action, it can remand the case to Customs. Customs 
then can ascertain the necessary additional facts as it normally does 
Co., 20 C.C.P.A. 251 (1932) (prior to 1955 amendments to valuation standards, importer 
must prove foreign value and export value, or that one was nonexistent, in order to show 
which is preferred). See also Brooks Paper Co. v. United States, 40 C.C.P.A. 38 (1952) 
(plaintiff must establish usual wholesale quantities in which such or similar merchandise was 
freely offered). Similarly, importers have demonstrated that the classification made by 
Customs was erroneous, but have lost by faiting to demonstrate the correct classification. 
United States v. Enrique C. Lineiro, 37 C.C.P.A. 5 (1949); New York Credit Men's Ad-
justment Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 1246 (Cust. Ct. ·1970). 
273 The evidence needed to prove the value of merchandise is often in the exporter's Illes 
and may be inaccessible to the importer. 
274 See note 4 7 supra and accompanying text. 
275 The dual burden of proof is not always difficult for the plaintiff to satisfy. When the 
same evidence can be used both to show that the Customs action was wrong and to establish 
the plaintiffs contentions, there is effectively a single burden of proof on the plaintiff. Thus, 
where the imp·ons could be classified under one of two possible classifications, proof that 
Custom's classification is in error may also demonstrate that the classification relied upon by 
the importer is correct. See Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 
568 (Cust. Ct. 1977). Or, if the only issue is whether a buying commission is bonafide (in 
which case it is not included in value), the same evidence used to rebut the presumption that 
Customs correctly decided the issue also may establish that the buying commission was bona 
fide. 
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(by all "reasonable means"), making a new administrative determi-
nation, which again would be presumptively correct and subject to 
a protest or petition. 
The recommendation here would preserve the presumption of 
correctness underlying action of the Customs Service, but would 
give the Customs Court authority either to modify or reverse the 
action, and to remand the proceeding to the Customs Service for a 
new determination. It is expected that the court would use its 
remand authority flexiblyi were the necessary facts readily avail-
able, the court might order the parties to produce them so that the 
court could make a final determination without remand. Often the 
parties themselves might introduce evidence facilitating a final de-
cision, or the Service might avoid remand by making alternative 
findings at the administrative _leveL 
The proposed change specifies that the court may determine 
what action is correct. This would enable the court to make 
findings which were more detrimental to the plaintiff than the 
original Customs decision. The court might, for example, find a 
classification which bore a higher rate of duty than the classification 
relied on by Customs or the plaintiff. Although some have argued 
that this threat of an adverse Customs Court decision might chill 
the interest of potential plaintiffs in judicial review, the rule con-
tained in the recommendations seems appropriate since it attempts 
to ensure that correct determinations will be made. 
Finally, the recommendation provides that a remand order of 
the Customs Court would be appealable to the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals. That court now has jurisdiction to review any 
"final order" of the Customs Court, but it is not dear whether this 
would by itself enable immediate review of remand orders; 276 the 
proposal would make this explicit. Such review is necessary to 
protect the right of the government to have decisions of the Cus-
toms Court re~iewed. Without it, if on remand the Customs Service 
made a determination with which the plaintiff agreed, there could 
076 Circuit courts have split on whether their authority to review a district court's "llnal 
order," 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), includes authority to review a district court order rem:llld-
ing a case to an administrative agency for further consideration. Compare Gueory v. 
Hampton, 510 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (remand order to Civil S-rvice Commis-
sion appealable as a "final order") and Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1970), rev"d 
on other grounds sub nom. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 ( 1971) with Pauls v. Secretary of 
the Air Force, 457 F.2d 294, 297-98 (1st Cir. 1972) and United Transport Union v.lll. Cent. 
Ry., 433 F.2d 566, 568-69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 ( 1970). 
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be no appeal and no means of having the remand decision re-
viewed. Therefore, immediate review of the remand decision 
should be permitted. 
Review of Decisions to Exclude Merchandise 
Merchandise entered through Customs control may be excluded 
from the United States in a variety of ways and for a variety of 
reasons. Customs may refuse to release the merchandise, seize the 
merchandise, or demand redelivery of merchandise already re-
leased. The decision to take such exclusionary action ma,y be made 
by Customs personnel or by personnel of another agency. 
Exclusion cases raise a multiplicity of issues. The recommenda-
tions made here address two: availability of timely review by the 
Customs Court, and exclusion under the trademark and copyright 
statutes. 
1. Expedited Review 
Congress should amend the statutes giving preference to certain types of 
cases in the Customs Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2633, and the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 2602, to ensure a similar preference for 
cases properly before either court· involving exclusion of merchandise from 
entry or delivery. 
There is justification for Customs continuing the present practice 
of holding merchandise pending an exclusion decision. Congress 
has prohibited some goods from entering the United States be-
cause of a legislative determination that use or circulation of the 
goods within the United States would be harmful; release of goods 
pending an exclusion decision would jeopardize the interests Con-
gress intended to protect. Moreover, because all merchandise must 
go through import processing, it is convenient to have Customs 
ensure that the merchandise meets regulatory standards.277 
277 Sometimes the practice of first holding or seizing merchandise and later deciding 
whether it should be excluded results in inconsistent treatment between imported merchan-
dise and domestic merchandise. For example, the owner of aU .S. trademark cannot enjoin a 
domestic firm from infringing the trademark without first demonstrating to a court (at least 
in a preliminary hearing) the validity of his trademark and the fact of infringement. 
However, he can effectively enjoin allegedly infringing imports merely by convincing Cus-
toms of the infringement and having the merchandise detained and seized. Similarly, an 
imported article allegedly infringing a copyright may be seized (even from the importer's 
customer) prior to adjudication of the fact of infringement; a domestic article could not be. 
See, e.g., Foreign &. Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952) (imported 
article infringing copyright can be seized even if in third party's hands, but infringing 
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However, unless the procedures for securing administrative and 
judicial review of a decision to exclude or seize merchandise are 
timely, it is often extremely prejudicial to hold the goods pending a 
decision. Imports may be perishable or seasonal merchandise, or 
the importer may need the merchandise to fulfill production· or 
marketing commitments. In such instances, even temporary exclu-
sion may have a permanent and irreparable effect on the importer. 
Moreover, issues surrounding exclusion should be dealt with 
promptly to enable importers to make future purchasing and 
shipping plans knowledgeably. -
Administrative and judicial decision-making processes now used 
in exclusion cases are sometimes inadequate. Exclusion of mer-
chandise under a customs law can be protested immediately and 
will be reviewed by Customs within 30 days after the protest is 
filed. However, no procedures protect against irreparable injury 
while decisions are being made and reconsidered or permit the 
Customs Court to review the decisions expeditiously. As one prom-
inent customs attorney has said: "There is no way to get speedy 
judicial review when speed is essential if the review is to be effec-
tive."278 
This proposal, coupled with the previous recommendations to 
authorize the Customs Court to. exercise the remedial power of 
district courts, should enable the Customs Court to provide a forum 
within which disputed issues in exclusion cases under its jurisdic-
tion can be speedily resolved. 
2. Customs Service Authority Under the Trademark and Copyright Stat-
utes 
Congress should amend the statutes under which the Customs Service is 
authorized to detain and seize merchandise that allegedly infringes a trade-
mark, 19 U.S.C. § 1526, or copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 603, to provide that 
the Customs Service may take no such action until the owner of the 
trademark or copyright obtains an order in the district court enjoining the 
importation. Alternatively, Congress should amend the trademark statute, as 
it has the copyright statute, to authorize the Customs Service to establish by 
regulation such a condition precedent to its acting to detain and seize 
articles which are domestic cannot be so seized). This consideration influenced the recom-
mendation below that C!fstoms be divested of authority to exclude merchandise for trade-
mark and copyright infringement. 
278 Address by George Bronz, Second Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals (May 29, 1975), reprinted in 69 F.R.D. 119, 182 (1976). 
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allegedly infringing merchandise, and the Customs Service should promul-
gate such a regulation. In any event, the Customs Service should adopt 
express procedures that would enable the owner of a trademark or copyright 
to identify imported merchandise that may infringe his mark or copyright. 
There are several reasons for this recommendation. First, as 
already noted, the detention and seizure of such merchandise by 
Customs places· imported merchandise in a different position from 
domestically produced merchandise. No government agency en-
forces trademark or copyright laws against domestic merchandise; 
domestic merchandise is not detained or seized because a govern-
ment employee believes it infringes a U.S. trademark or copyright. 
The owner of a trademark or copyright who wishes to enjoin 
commerce in allegedly infringing domestic merchandise must first 
prove the infringement and the validity of his trademark or copy-
right in court. _ 
The different treatment of imported merchandise is harmful 
and unjustified. Importers risk substantial delays because of deci-
sions made by an import specialist. In effect, the importer can be 
enjoined from dealing in his merchandise even before there is an 
adjudicated decision concerning the infringement claim. More-
over, owners of U.S. trademarks have ample incentive and ability 
to protect their own interests. Unlawful importation can be en-
joined; and importers can be sued for damages resulting from past 
unlawful importations.279 
Congress has recognized that under the copyright act "[t]he 
Customs Service is often in no position to make determinations as 
to whether particular articles are piratical."280 As a result, Congress 
has given the Treasury Department authority to require by regula-
tion that the person seeking exclusion either obtain a court order 
enjoining importation or furnish proof of his claim and post a 
bond to cover damages resulting from Customs' unjustified deten-
tion or exclusion of merchandise.281 Similar considerations inc 
fluence the recommendation concerning the action Customs takes 
279 There is some risk that foreign exporters desiring to sell infringing merchandise in the 
United States (and not themselves subject to suit in the United States) could avoid liability by 
dealing through importers who would be judgment proof. This appears to be an unlikely 
occurrence, and an acceptable risk that can be minimized through effective enforcement of 
judgments. 
280 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
AD. NEWS 5659, 5787. 
281 General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101,90 Stat. 2541 (1976) 
(to be codified at 17 U .S.C. § 603). 
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under the trademark act. The expertise of the Customs Service is 
not geared toward deciding the sensitive issues surrounding possi-
ble consumer confusion in trademark disputes, and Customs' 
decision-making in such disputes cannot encompass all of the sub-
stantive questions that need to be examined. For example, when 
deciding whether imports infringe a registered trademark, Cus-
toms has no authority to consider the validity of the trademark 
registration. As a result, in at least one case Customs has seized and 
destroyed merchandise for allegedly infringing a trademark even 
though the trademark did not qualify for registration and was 
therefore not entitled to protection.282 
Imposition of Civil Penalties 
The means by which the· Customs Service assesses and collects 
civil penalties, particularly under section 592 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, have been under auack for a number of years. 283 Knowl-
edgeable observers have correctly noted the "unfairness and ob-
solescence"284 of this "antiquated"285 provision that leads to "arbi-
trary and irresponsible behavior ."286 
David R. Macdonald, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 
referred to "the Section 592 magnum," combining the qualities of a 
"Gatling gun and a 10-pound smooth bore cannon." The only 
problem with using section 592, he said, "is that sometimes it's 
difficult to identify the victim afterwards."287 It is easy to see 1Nhy. 
The statutory penalty for section 592 violations is usually dispro-
portionate to the nature of the conduct and degree of culpability 
involved and to the revenue deficiency or other injury resulting 
from the violation. The mitigation procedure is intended to 
ameliorate the harsh effects of the statutory penalty, but instead it 
'"" See Platilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (following seizure 
and destrucrion of merchandise bearing allegedly infringing mark, the trademark alleged to 
have been infringed was found to be invalid). 
283 For a discussion of enforcement of section 592, see teJ~t accompanying notes 111-34 
supra. 
28
·' Dickey II, supra note 112, at 694. 
285 
_Modernization Act Hearings, supra note 9, at 188 (statement of Robert E. Herzstein). 
286 American Importers Ass'n, Why Customs' Penalty Statute (Sec. 592) Must be 
Changed! (unpublished position paper on file with the Administrative Conference of the 
United States). 
287 Address by David R. Macdonald, Ass't Secretary of the Treasury, before the American 
Importers Ass'n (Sept. 10, 1974), reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Treasury News Release (Sept. 10, 
!974). 
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shields the administrative action of penalty assessment from judi-
cial review.288 Persons against whom a penalty is assessed by Cus-
toms virtually always accept a mitigated penalty and thus forego 
judicial review. As a result, Customs is not held accountable 
through the judicial review process for what it does. 
There are many proposals for the reform of section 592.289 The 
recommendations below articulate a number of principles for its 
reform.290 
1. Penalties 
Section 592 should be amended to provide for civil money penalties 
against the person violating the statute rather than for forfeiture of the 
merchandise or the full value thereof. Congress should establish maximum 
penalties based upon the revenue deficiency, if any, resulting from the 
violation, and upon the degree of culpability of the violator. In any case in 
which the violation does not result in a revenue deficiency, the maximum 
penalties should be based upon a portion of the value of the imported 
merchandise and upon the degree of culpability of the violator .. If the 
violator is an· importer, he should be given the option of surrendering his 
merchandise in lieu of payment of any penalty assessed. 
The first principle of these recommendations is that section 592 
should be revised so that forfeiture of merchandise, or its full value, 
is no longer the penalty for section 592 violations. Establishing 
penalties based upon the value of merchandise means that penal-
ties often bear no relation to the conduct constituting the violation 
or to the culpability of the violator. This leads to unequal treat-
ment: for example, two persons who separately misstate the invoice 
price of imports would be subject to differing penalties solely 
because the value of their merchandise is different. It also leads to 
denial of judicial review: the assessed penalty often is so dispro-
portionate to the violation that companies may feel compelled to 
accept mitigation offered by the Customs Service rather than take 
288 See generally Dickey I, supra note 112; Dickey II, supra note 112; Herzstein, supra note 
112. 
289 See, e.g., Dickey 11, supra note 112, at 729. In addition, the Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States, the American Importers Association, and many other persons and organi-
zations have proposed reforms. The recommendations made here are similar to provisions 
of legislation now before the House of Representatives. 
290 The recommendations do not address several issues raised by other proposals to 
reform section 592, e.g., the definition of conduct that violates section 592; the applicable 
statute of limitations (see 19 U .S.C. § 1621 (1970)); and reduced penalties for the voluntary 
disclosure of violations. See 19 C.F.R. § 171.1 ( 1977). 
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the risk of seeking judicial review. Therefore, forfeiture should be 
dropped as a sanction fo:r section 592 violations. 
h is also recommended that the penalty in section 592 be stated as 
a maximum amount rather than a fixed amount, and that the coun 
reviewing the penalty assessment should have the authority to 
determine independently the amount of penalty to be imposed. 
Penalties in fixed amounts for prohibited conduct have some ad-
vantages over maximum penalties; they are predictable and uni-
form and avoid problems of disoaritv in the sanctions annlied in 
different cases.29 i For these reasO'ns the Administrative cddference 
of the United States rejected, in its study of penalties imposed by 
the Internal Revenue Service, the idea that IRS penalty statutes 
should contain maximum penalties and recommended instead that 
penalties be in a fixed amount.292 However, there is no standard 
model to follow; penalties are . sometimes fixed by statute and 
sometimes determined by the decision-maker within maximum 
penalties established by statute.293 
In the context of section 592, penalties in fixed amounts would 
be unwise because often they would be disproportionate to the 
violation. Conduct challenged under section 592 varies widely. Vio-
lations of section 592 include misstatements of: the invoice price of 
the merchandise; its quantity or weight; and its country of origin. 
Each may result from different motivations, require different de-
grees of volition or subject the violator to different risks of detec-
tion. In addition, the culpability of the violator is often a matter of 
degree. Even negligent conduct-the failure to adopt procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that mistakes do not occur-is not a 
single concept, but can embody various degrees of culpability de-
pending upon the circumstances. 
Many mitigating and aggravating circumstances should be taken 
291 See Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U .LQ. 
265, 276; Goldschmid, Report in Support of Recommendation 72-6: An Evaluation of the Present 
and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, 2 
RecOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTs OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 896, 942 (1972). 
292 ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A .. D1\HNISTPJ-~TrvE PRocEDUP....Es OF 
THE INTERNAL REveNue ScRVrcc, S. Doc No. 266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 646-49 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as IRS REPORT]. 
293 Compare I.R.C. § 6653 (penalties in fixed amounts for civil fraud, negligence, and 
intentional disregard of rules or regulations) with Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 
of 1969. 30 U .S.C. § 8l9(a)(l) ( 1970) (maximum penalties). Over half the penalties adminis-
tered by federal agencies provide for variable or maximum penalties. Goldschmid. supra 
note 291, at 957-64. 
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into account so that penalties reflect the seriousness of the viola-
tion. The Customs Service lists the following seven factors it con-
siders when ruling on petitions for mitigation: the fact that loss of 
revenue from the violation is small in relation ~o the forfeiture 
value; contributory error by a Customs employee; cooperation of 
the offender in the investigation; inexperience in importing; re-
medial action taken after the violation was discovered, including 
rectification of any revenue deficiency resulting from the violation; 
prior good record; and inability to pay.294 It also lists several 
aggravating factors: conduct impeding the investigation; previous 
record of a violation; or experience in importing.295 Regardless of 
the relevance of, or the weight to be given to, these particular 
factors, it is clear that many variables determine the seriousness of 
any section 592 violation. 
As a result of the many variables in section 592 cases, it would be 
virtually impossible to establish fixed statutory penalties to reflect 
all of the different elements that should be taken into account in 
determining an appropriate sanction. Therefore, the fixed penal-
ties, unless mitigated by administrative discretion, would be in-
equitably high in some cases; in other cases they would be ineffec-
tive as a deterrent. 
Moreover, with penalties in fixed amounts the Customs Service 
would continue to be able to shield its administrative determina-
tions from judicial review by making a mitigation offer the alleged 
violator would accept in order to avoid the fixed penalty which 
would be imposed if the finding of a violation were upheld by a 
reviewing court. This power of "administrative blackmail" makes 
the present enforcement of section 592 unfair and should not be 
continued. 
For these reasons, Congress should enact a maximum penalty, 
and should authorize the court reviewing section 592 assessments 
to make an independent determination of the amount of the pen-
alty to be imposed. Maximum penalties for section 592 violations 
will be most realistic and effective if they are based upon some 
multiple of the loss of revenue to the government ensuing fmm the 
29
' 39 Fed. Reg. 39,061 (1974). Customs also lists as a "mitigating" factor the "probable 
difficulty in collecting because offender is outside the jurisdiction of the United States." 
Although practicality may induce Customs to mitigate penalty assessments in order to collect 
something on assessments that would otherwise be uncollectible, this does not seem to be a 
"mitigating" factor as that term is generally used. 
295 /d. at 39,062. 
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violation. This is true because such loss measures both the injury to 
the government from the violation and the benefit of the prohibited 
conduct in question to the violator. Such penalties deter violations 
and compensate the government for losses and risks of undetected 
violations. Determining the multiple of the loss of revenue that 
should be established as a penalty will require careful examination 
of the difficulty of detecting violations and the deterrent effect of 
various penalty amounts. Congress could consider the multiples of 
revenue deficiency now used by Customs in mitigating penalty 
assessments as a starting point for its analysis of these questions. 
It is recommended that the penalties under section 592 be estab-
lished for three degrees of culpability.296 This is necessary because 
often conduct may be intentional (i.e., with knmvledge that under-
payment of duties will result) or reckless (i.e.; with disregard of a 
substantial risk that underpayment will result) without being severe 
enough to warrant a heavy penalty for fraudulent conduct.297 In 
such cases, a middle category of defined culpability will help to 
ensure that the sanction fits the violation. 
A small percentage of section 592 proceedings involve violations 
which harm the interests Customs is charged with protecting, but 
do not cause a loss of revenue. This occurs, for example, when a 
false or fraudulent practice enables an importer to avoid a quota 
restriction, but the importer pays the proper duty on the mer-
chandise. In such cases it is difficult to establish a statutory penalty 
that compensates the government for ir~ury to its interests and also 
deters violations. In order to promote certainty and flexibility in 
setting the penalty, the recommendation would provide that when 
there is no loss of revenue to the government the maximum pen-
206 This proposal is derived from the recommendations of the Administrative Conference 
of the United States concerning penalties imposed for understatement of federal income 
taxes. See Recommendation 75-7 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 41 
Fed. Reg. 3981, 3984-85 (1976), I C.F.R. § 305.75-.77 (1977). There, three degrees of 
culpability-negligence, reckless or intentional conduct, and fraud-were found to be neces-
sary. With only two standards of culpability (one for negligent conduct and one for fraudu-
lent conduct) "a surprisingly broad range of conduct is covered by the negligence penalty. 
Intentional misstatements are often penalized with the same degree of harshness as mere 
negligence. Such whimsical and unequal results are probably quite different from what 
Congress intended." REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES Of THE ]NTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE, supra note 281, at 641. 
'"
7 The Customs Service already employs three standards of culpability in deciding 
whether to mitigate assessed penalties: negligence, gross negligence, and fraud. 39 Fed. Reg. 
39,061 (1974). 
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alty would equal some portion of the value of the imported· 
merchandise. This would reduce the coercive impact of the present 
forfeiture penalty while maintaning a high penalty as a deterrent. · 
The recommendation also provides the alleged violator of sec-
tion 592 with the option of surrendering the imported merchan-
dise in lieu of paying the statutory penalty. This will occur rarely, 
because in most circumstances the value of the merchandise to the 
alleged violator will be very much greater than the potential mone-
tary penalty. This option is necessary, however, because of pecu-
liarities in the appraisement of merchandise. An imported manu-
script for a book, for example, may be appraised at a ·value which 
includes the value of the research undertaken to write the book. In ,. 
such cases the appraised value of the merchandise, and thus the 
potential loss of revenue, is greatly disproportionate to the value of 
the merchandise to the importer. Accordingly, the option allowing 
the violator to surrender the merchandise will ensure that penalties 
based upo'n loss of revenue are not themselves disproportionate to 
the violation. 
2. Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review 
The Customs Service should have the authority to assess and to mitigate 
civil penalties. If an assessment is contested, action by the government to 
enforce a penalty should be in the Customs Court. In such an action, the 
government should have the burden of proving the act or omission constitut-
ing a violation and, if so alleged, the intentional nature thereof The 
Customs Court should be authorized to determine de novo the amount of 
the penalty. 
It is recommended that the Customs Service maintain the penalty 
assessment and mitigation procedures it uses now. If an assessment 
is contested, the Service should be required to bring an enforce-
ment action in a court. Customs' informal administrative proce-
dures enable it to dispose of large numbers of cases without unnec-
essary procedural burdens. At the saine time, procedural fairness 
should be guaranteed to alleged violators through full judicial 
review. The Administrative Conference of the United States has 
recommended that civil money penalties be assessed in most cases 
through adjudicatory procedures at the agency leveJ.298 The pro-
posal here, while it deviates in form from that recommendation, is 
298 See Recommendation 72-0: Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, 2 REPORTS AND REcoM-
MENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (1973). 
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consistent with the basis of the recommendation-that assessing 
and collecting penalties would be facilitated if the agency were not 
required to initiate assessment actions· in a federal district court. 
Since the Customs Court is a specialized court with expertise in the 
underlying substantive issues, many of the factors normally sup-
porting adjudication at the administrative· level support adjudica-
tion of Customs penalty cases in the Customs Court.299 
A significant issue raised by proposals to reform section 592 is 
whether governmentenforcement actions300 under section 592 will 
be brought in a district court, in the Cl_!stoms Court, or both. Most 
other proposals for the reform of section 592 contemplate that 
such actions will continue in the district court,301 although another 
possibility would involve concurrent jurisdiction in the Customs 
Court and district courts. Under the latter option, cases could be 
brought in the district co{zrt, but the defendant would have the 
option of transferring the case to the Customs Court under proce-
dures patterned after those used in removing a suit from a state to 
a federal court.302 The r~commendation of this article would place 
exclusive jurisdiction over penalty cases in the Customs Court. 
Three factors support this arrangement, although there are 
countervailing considerations. First, the Customs Court has more 
experience than district courts with the issues that often arise in 
section 592 proceedings. Although questions of fact can be decided 
with equal ease by the Customs Court and district courts, the 
resolution of section 592 issues often requires interpretation and 
application of the customs law, a function that in nonpenalty cases 
is generally performed exclusively by the Customs Court.303 Such 
299 Thus, crowding of district court dockets is not a factor favoring administrative adjudi-
cation in this instance. The need for specialized knowledge and expertise, the degree to 
which issues of law are likely to arise, the importance of consistency of outcome, and the 
likelihood that an agency will establish an impartial forum-factors mentioned by Professor 
Goldschmid in his report, supra note 291 at 932-33-all support adjudication in the Customs 
Court. · 
300 The term "government enforcement actions" is used because this Article does not 
consider whether the Customs Service should be authorized to directly enforce section 592 
in court without relying, as it now does, upon Department of Justice enforcement actions. 
301 This is true of both H.R. 8149 and H.R. 8367, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), as well as 
the proposals advanced by the American Bar Association, the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States, and the American Importers Association. Most of these private groups, 
however, appear not to have focused on which forum is most appropriate for the review of 
section 5 92 cases. 
302 The procedures for removing a case from a state to a federal court are in 28 U .S.C. § 
1446 (1970). 
303 The Customs Court is best able to decide, for example, whether blueprints given by an 
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issues frequently arise in section 592 proceedings, and adjudication 
in the Customs Court should facilitate and ensure consistency in 
the resolution of these issues. ,. 
A second factor favoring enforcement of section 592 in the 
Customs Court is the likelihood that it will impose more uniform 
penalties. With enforcement in 9-istrict courts, cases would be 
brought before judges throughout the country, each judge would 
hear few cases, and judges would not be familiar with decisions 
made by other judges. By contrast, centralizing the decision-
making in one court with a small number of judges would facilitate 
(although not necessarily ensure) the development of a consistent 
judicial consensus concerning penalties to be imposed. 
The third factor favoring Customs Court enforcement of section 
592 is that the Customs Court can assure speedier adjudication 
because its docket is less crowded than the dockets of the district 
courts. Indeed, the underutilization of the resources of the Cus-
toms Court suggests that it could assume at least some new respon-
sibilities without need for additional resources.304 Thus, enforce-
ment of section 592 in the Customs Court would promote a better 
allocation of judicial resources. 
Two potential drawbacks to enforcing section 592 in the Customs 
Court can be overcome. The first is that the Customs Court sits 
primarily in New York City while district courts may be more 
accessible to persons at ports in other cities. However, the Customs 
Court is authorized to hold trials at any place within its jurisdiction 
and does sit at trials in many places.305 The judges of the Customs 
Court can "ride circuit," ensuring that those subject to section 592 
proceedings are not unduly prejudiced by the location of a trial. 
Although this would involve some delay in scheduling trials, the 
delay is likely to be shorter than the delay attendant upon litigation 
in a district court. 
The second potential drawback is that in the Customs Court 
issues of fact are decided by a judge, not a jury. Some defendants 
in section 592 cases may feel the loss of a right to a jury trial to be 
significant.. It seems clear that the constitutional guarantee of a 
importer to a foreign supplier should have been declared as a dutiable "assist" and whether 
the failure to make such declaration violates section 592. Similarly, questions concerning the 
declaration of "selling commissions" and interpretations of other intricate customs laws and 
regulations raise issues which by experience the Customs Court is best suited to handle. 
304 See notes 208-09 supra and accompanying text. 
305 28 U .S.C. § 256 (1970). 
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right to a jury trial does not extend to enforcement proceedings 
brought by the government to assess or collect civil penalties. Re-
cently, in Atlas Rorifing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Comm'n, 306 the Supreme Court held that: 
in cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated-e.g., 
cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign 
capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes within 
the power of Congress to enact-the Seventh Amendment 
does not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact-finding 
function and initial adjudication to an administrative 
forum with which the jury would be incompatible. 307 
Because section 592 suits are brought by the government in its 
sovereign capacity to enforce a "public right," Congress could as-
sign the fact-finding function in section 592 proceedings to an 
administrative tribunal, and a fortiori to a federal judge without a 
Jury. 
A more difficult question is whether Congress should make jury 
trials available in section 592 proceedings even though the Con-
stitution does not :require it to do so. It is not necessary to decide 
that question, however, to determine that the Customs Court is the 
preferred forum. In view of the advantages the Customs Court 
offers for section 592 enforcement, should it see fit to do so, 
Congress could authorize the Customs Court to empanel juries for 
that purpose. 
Under present law, when the government sues to recover a 
penalty under section 592 (or any of the other penalty provisions 
enforced by Customs) it need only show probable cause for the 
institution of the suit. Hit does so the penalty is imposed unless the 
:respondent proves that the statute was not violated .308 In view of 
the informal administrative process used by Customs to determine 
whether section 592 has been violated ,309 this :rule is unsatisfactory. 
It shields the administrative determination from :review by requir-
ing alleged violators to assume the difficult burden of demonstrat-
ing that an alleged act did not occur. 
306 97 S. Ct. I26I (I 977). 
307 I d. at I 266. This conclusion was reached by some scholars even before the Atlas Roofing 
decision. See, e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 29I, at 943. 
308 I 9 U.S.C. § I 6I5 (I 970). See, e.g., United States v. One J 97I Chevrolet Corvette Auto, 
496 F.2d 2J 0 (5th Cir. I 974); United States v. Fields, 425 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1970). 
309 See notes I2I-32 supra and accompanying text. 
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The proper allocation of the risk that the trier of fact, faced with 
conflicting reasonable inferences, will doubt the inference asserted 
by a party, depends on considerations of fairness, convenience, and 
policy.310 The party seeking to change the present state of affairs 
or impose a sanction normally bears the risk of non persuasion. 311 
This is generally desirable because. it reduces the chance. that the 
status quo will be changed or the sanction imposed erroneously. 
The risk may also be imposed on the party who contends that the 
more uhusual event has occurred,312 and is often allocated to avoid 
requiring a party to prove a negative-so that a party need not 
prove that an act did not occur. 
Based upon these factors, it is recommended that in proceedings 
to enforce section 592 the government have the burden of proving 
the acts constituting, the violation and, if it seeks penalties for 
intentional (i.e., non-negligent) conduct, that the acts were done 
intentionally.313 This should be required because in section 592 
cases the government seeks to impose a heavy penalty. As long as 
the penalty assessment is based upon informal procedures the 
government should bear the burden of proof so that the facts 
underlying the assessment are subjected to full and impartial 
scrutiny. The burden of proving that conduct was intentional is not 
unduly severe, since such conduct generally requires an overt act 
(e.g., double invoicing) which is capable of discovery and proof. 
On the other hand, if the government seeks penalties for al-
legedly negligent conduct, this recommendation would not require 
the government to demonstrate that the plaintiff failed to exercise 
due care. It need only prove that the false statement or practice 
occurred; the defendant would then have the burden of proving 
that he exercised due care (i.e., that he employed practices rea-
sonably designed to avoid acts of the type alleged to constitute the 
violation).314 Shifting the burden of proof in this way relieves the 
310 IX j. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940); E. MoRGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS 
OF EviDENCE 28 ( 1962). 
311 C. 'McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 786 (2d ed. 1972}; Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay 
on juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 7 (1959). 
312 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 311, at 787. 
313 Thus, the presumption of correctness of Customs action, 28 U.S.C. § 2635(a) (1970), 
would not be applicable in section 592 cases. 
314 The recommendation contemplates that proof of false statements or. practices will 
create a rebuttable presumption that the act or practice resulted from negligence. Even if 
this were not explicitly stated, it is likely to happen as a practical matter in the trial of 
negligence cases. 
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government from proving a negative (Lhe absence of due care) and 
decreases the risks that false statements win go unsanctioned be-
cause of uncertainty over the required standard of care. 
This recommendation is inconsistent in one respect with a similar 
recommendation the Administrative Conference of the United 
States made concerning the enforcement of penalties by the KRS. 
Under that recommendation the alleged violator would have the 
burden of persuasion if the government sought penalties for an 
intentional or reckless violation,315 primarily because "the facts 
concerning his state of mind are in his possessio11.''316 The premise 
supporting that approach is undoubtedly accurate, but the recom-
mendation does not necessarily follow from the premise. Although 
a person knows whar he intended, he should not necessarily have 
the burden of persuasion on that issue317 since that would require 
him to prove a negative-that" he did not know the consequences of 
his conduct.318 In view of the high penalties which are likely to be 
adopted for intentional violations of section 592319 the alleged 
violator should not have that burden. 
3. Publishing Standards 
ln order to ensure that those subject to possible penalties under section 
592 know what is expected of them under the laws administered and 
enforced by the Customs Service, the Service should, to the maximum extent 
feasible, adopt and publish standards that will guide its determinations 
under those laws. 
This recommendation is proposed because a significant number 
of penalty assessments are attributable to misinterpretation of Cus-
toms requirements by the alleged violator, or failure to understand 
one of his duties as an importer. For example, an importer must 
furnish on the entry documents all information necessary to estab-
lish the value of goods. He may, however, fail to declare (as is 
required) the value of blueprints or drawings or other assists given 
to the foreign supplier, and thus submit a "false" statement to the 
~ -
315 Recommendations 75-77 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 41 
Fed. Reg. 3981, 3984 (1976); I C.F.R. § 305.75-77 (1977). 
316 IRS REPORT, supra ·note 292, at 549-50. 
317 See j. WIGMORE, supra note 310, at 275; E. MoRGAN, supra note 310, at 28. 
31° For example, under section 592 an importer charged with failing to declare an assist 
would have the burden of proving that he did not know that the assist should be declared. 
319 See, e.g., H.R. 8149, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., § I 12(a) (1977), which sets the penalty for 
violations resulting from gross negligence at four times the loss of revenue resulting from 
the violation or the domestic value of the merchandise, whichever is less. 
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Customs Service. Yet there are no regulations defining an assist or 
even stating that it must be declared. The alleged violator therefore 
may be penalized unfairly for violating a rule that was difficult for 
him to interpret or know of at all. To alleviate such problems, the 
Customs Service should adopt and publish standards that will 
guide its determination of what conduct constitutes a violation. 
4. Seizure 
The authority of the Customs Service to seize and hold merchandise under 
section 592 (other than prohibited or restricted merchandise) should be 
·limited to instances where it is necessary to protect Customs' ability to collect 
any revenue deficiency or penalty, and the Service should be required to 
release the merchandise to the owner upon his provision of security for 
payment of that revenue or penalty. Where no such release is effected by the 
owner, the Customs Service should be required to release the merchandise not 
later than 60 days after seizure, unless the government has initiated an 
action in the Customs Court within that period and obtained an extension 
for good cause from the court. In instances where the Customs Court permits 
the Service to hold merchandise for sale by the Service to satisfy any revenue 
deficiency or penalty determined by the court, the net proceeds of such sale, 
after allowance for the judgment and costs of the sale, should be paid to the 
owner. 
Seizure of merchandise is a drastic, coercive sanction, with effects 
usually disproportionate to the section 592 violation. The authori-
zation for seizure in section 592 reflects the antiquated conception 
of section 592 as in rem remedy, which is no longer appropriate. 
Because virtually all importers (and others potentially subject to 
section 592) are solvent, and most do business regularly in the 
United States, seizure is generally unnecessary to ensure collection 
of penalty assessments. 
The Customs Service recently amended the Customs regulations 
to reflect evolving practice, providing that merchandise shall only 
be seized for violations of section 592 if the district director is 
satisfied that the violator appears to be, or may soon become, 
insolvent; the violator or his assets appear to be beyond the juris-
diction of the United States; or for some other reason a claim for 
the domestic value of the merchandise would not protect the reve-
nue.320 This is sound practice and should be adopted in legisla-
320 42 Fed. Reg. 25,323 (1977) corrected by 42 Fed. Reg. 27,599 (1977) (to be codified in 19 
C.F.R. § !62.4I(a)(3)). 
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tion.321 The :recommendations of this anicle would do so by au-
tho:rizing the Customs SeTVice to seize merchandise under section 
592 only when the merchandise is itself prohibited from entering 
the country, or when seizure is necessary to protect the ability of 
Customs to collect any revenue defiCiency o:r penalty. The recom-
mendation would also require the Customs Service to release non:-
. prohibited merchandise upon the provision of security for the pay-
ment of such revenue or deficiency. Forfeiture would not be a 
sanction; it would be used only when necessary to satisfy the judg-
ment of the court. The net proceeds of the forfeiture sale, after 
allowance for the judgment and costs of sale, would be paid to the 
owner. 
The recommendation also includes procedures to ensure that 
any seizure by the Customs Service under section 592-a drastic 
sanction based on an info:r~al administrative determination-is 
subject to prompt and impartial judicial review. H the owner has 
not obtained the :release of merchandise which has been seized, the 
Customs Service would be required to release the merchandise not 
later than 60 days after seizure unless the government initiated a 
collection action and obtained an extension for good cause from 
the court. 
5. Other Statutes 
Each of the other penalty provisions enforced by the Customs Service 
should be reviewed and Tevised where appropriate in a manner consistent 
with the fm·egoing recormnendaiions. 
Section 592 is only one of 40 provisions that authorize the Cus-
toms Service to impose civil penalties or fines, some of which have 
the same undesirable characteristics as section 592. 322 Penalties are 
often enormously high in relation i:o the nature of the violation or 
the culpability of the violator. The mitigation procedures that im-
pede judicial review of section 592 penalty cases are used in the 
enforcement of the other penahy provisions as \vell. 323 Accord-
m H.R. 8149, 95th Con g., 1st Sess. § 112(a) (I Y77), contains a similar provision. H.R. 
8367, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), the proposal drafted by the Department of Treasury, 
does not. 
300 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1586 (1970) (Customs may seize vessels unloading merchandise 
without a permit); id. § 1585 (Customs may seize vessel if its master fails to report the entry of 
the vessel); id. § 1584 (Customs may seize merchandise not included on a vessel's manifest). 
Although such sanctions may be appropriate when smuggling is involved, they do not seem 
appropriate if the conduct results from negligence. 
323 See Procedural Reform Hearings, supra note 14, at 241 (statement of Philip Steinberg), 
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ingly; the other penalty provisions should be reviewed to assess 
how they can be changed to better serve both the trading commu-
nity and the other interests Customs is mandated to protect. 
249 (statement of Wiley R. George), and 450 (statement of Independent Freight Forwarders 
and Customs Brokers Ass'n). 
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